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Abstract
We consider a matching market where buyers and sellers arrive according to inde-
pendent Poisson processes at the same rate and independently abandon the market
if not matched after an exponential amount of time with the same mean. In this
centralized market, the utility for the system manager from matching any buyer and
any seller is a general random variable. We consider a sequence of systems indexed
by n where the arrivals in the nth system are sped up by a factor of n. We analyze
two families of one-parameter policies: the population threshold policy immediately
matches an arriving agent to its best available mate only if the number of mates in the
system is above a threshold, and the utility threshold policy matches an arriving agent
to its best available mate only if the corresponding utility is above a threshold. Using
an asymptotic fluid analysis of the two-dimensional Markov process of buyers and sell-
ers, we show that when the matching utility distribution is light-tailed, the population
threshold policy with threshold nlnn is asymptotically optimal among all policies that
make matches only at agent arrival epochs. In the heavy-tailed case, we characterize
the optimal threshold level for both policies. We also study the utility threshold policy
in an unbalanced matching market with heavy-tailed matching utilities, and find that
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the buyers and sellers have the same asymptotically optimal utility threshold. To illus-
trate our theoretical results, we use extreme value theory to derive optimal thresholds
when the matching utility distribution is exponential, uniform, Pareto, and correlated
Pareto. In general, we find that as the right tail of the matching utility distribution
gets heavier, the threshold level of each policy (and hence market thickness) increases,
as does the magnitude by which the utility threshold policy outperforms the population
threshold policy.
Keywords: Matching markets, queueing asymptotics, regularly varying functions, ex-
treme value theory
1 Introduction
We consider a symmetric centralized dynamic matching market (the asymmetric case is also
discussed for heavy-tailed utilities). Two types of agents, which we call buyers and sellers,
arrive to the market according to independent Poisson processes with rate λ, and each agent
abandons (i.e., exits) the market after an independent exponential amount of time with
rate η if he has not yet been matched. The utility of a match between any buyer and any
seller is a general random variable. In this centralized model, the agents make no explicit
decisions, and at the time of an agent arrival, the system manager observes all matching
utilities between the arrival and all potential mates (e.g., sellers if the arrival is a buyer)
who are currently in the market. Using information about the number of buyers and sellers
and their matching utilities, the system manager decides when to make matches and which
agents to match.
Centralized dynamic matching markets occur in settings such as organ transplants,
public housing, labor markets and various online platforms. In practice, matching utilities
include information about tissue type matching and the geographical distance between the
donor and the recipient for organ transplants; the location and desirability of the residence
and the distance between the residence and the applicant’s current residence in public hous-
ing; and the match between the needs of the employer and the experience and skills of the job
applicant in the labor market. This information can lead to wide variations in the matching
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utilities between different buyers and sellers, and our goal is to understand how best to ex-
ploit this variation when managing the market. However, in our idealized model, the details
about this information are suppressed (e.g., we do not use covariates describing the agents to
help make decisions) and aggregated into the matching utility distribution between buyers
and sellers.
A key issue in centralized dynamic matching markets is to find the optimal market
thickness; i.e., rather than match a new agent upon its arrival, it may be preferable to place
the arriving agent in the market and allow more agents to arrive in the hope of making a
higher-utility match in the future. In our model, we aim to maximize the long-run expected
average utility rate (i.e., utility of matches per unit time) of all matches. Although we do
not include agent waiting costs, a strategy that forces agents to wait too long for the market
to thicken can backfire because agents may abandon the market before they are matched.
Due to the challenging nature of this problem, we resort to asymptotic methods. We
consider a sequence of systems where the arrival rates in the nth system are multiplied by
n > 0. In the absence of any matching, the number of agents of each type would be precisely
the number of customers in a M/M/∞ queue, which would be O(n). We use two types
of asymptotic methods: one is a fluid analysis of the two-dimensional Markov process for
the number of buyers and sellers in the market when the arrival rates are large. The other
is extreme value theory (Gumbel 1958, Galambos 1978) and regularly varying functions
(Resnick 1987), which are used because the utility of a match under the policies we consider
is the maximum of a (typically) large number of random variables.
In this asymptotic regime, we compute an upper bound on the utility rate of any
policy that makes matches only at agent arrival epochs, and compare it to the utility rate of
two families of threshold policies: the population threshold policy and the utility threshold
policy. Under the population threshold policy, the system manager immediately matches an
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arriving agent to the available mate with the highest matching utility (at which point, the
arriving agent and its matched mate exit the system and their matching utility is collected by
the system manager) only if the number of available mates in the market exceeds a specified
threshold; otherwise, the arriving agent is not immediately matched and is instead placed in
the market. Under the utility threshold policy, the arriving agent is immediately matched
to its best available mate only if the corresponding matching utility exceeds a specified
threshold.
1.1 Preview of Results
In extreme value theory, the limiting distribution of the maximum of many random vari-
ables can be one of three types, loosely based on whether the underlying distribution of
these random variables has an exponential right tail, has a heavier (e.g., power law) right
tail, or is bounded from above, and our results are qualitatively different in each case. Al-
though our main results are couched in terms of regularly varying functions, we preview our
results with three canonical examples – one from each of the three domains of attraction –
in the symmetric case, which are analyzed in §5 (Table 1). When matching utilities have an
exponential distribution, the population threshold policy with a threshold of n
lnn
is asymp-
totically optimal with a utility rate that is O(n lnn) and twice as large as the utility rate
of the greedy policy – i.e., the population threshold policy with a threshold of zero – in the
limit. When the matching utilities have a Pareto (c, β) distribution with shape parameter
β > 1 (and hence a finite mean), the optimal population threshold is λ
η(1+β)
n. Although the
utility rate of this threshold policy does not converge to the loose upper bound in this case,
the utility rate and the upper bound are both O(n1+1/β), whereas the utility rate under the
greedy policy is only O(n1+1/(2β)). When the matching utilities have a uniform distribution,
the greedy policy is asymptotically optimal and the optimal utility rate is O(n).
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In the Pareto case, the optimal utility threshold is 0.763
√
πn when c = 1 and β = 2,
and the corresponding utility rate is O(n1+1/β). This asymptotic utility rate is computed ex-
plicitly and it is shown to be larger than the utility rate of the optimal population threshold
policy. In the exponential and uniform cases, where we have already identified an asymp-
totically optimal policy, we use heuristics to compute, in the pre-limit, utility threshold
policies that are consistent with the asymptotically optimal descriptions, but outperform in
simulation results the population threshold policy. We also consider a positively correlated
Pareto case in §5.4, and show that the optimal population threshold is independent of the
correlation, the optimal utility threshold decreases as the correlation increases, and the util-
ity rates of both threshold policies decrease as the correlation increases. In §7, we consider
an unbalanced market, where buyers have a different arrival rate and abandonment rate
than sellers, and formally (i.e., without proofs) analyze the utility threshold policy in the
heavy-tailed case. Surprisingly, although we allow the buyers and sellers to have a different
utility threshold, we find that they have the same asymptotically optimal utility threshold.
Taken together, the optimal amount of patience – and hence market thickness - in-
creases with the right tail of the matching utility distribution, as does the optimal utility
rate and the performance gap between the utility threshold policy and the population thresh-
old policy. Our limited analysis of an unbalanced market suggests that the optimal market
thickness also increases with the amount of imbalance.
1.2 Related Work
Matching markets is a large and active area of research, and we restrict our review to
centralized dynamic markets. Although our model lacks the contextual richness of some of
the models for specific types of markets, the most distinctive feature of our model is the
general matching utilities, which allows us to understand how the right tail of the matching
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utility distribution impacts the optimal thickness of the market (Table 1). In contrast, much
of the recent work in dynamic (centralized or decentralized) matching markets, either via
two-type agents (e.g., easy-to-match or hard-to-match agents, or matches that are preferred
or non-preferred, Baccara et al. 2015, Ashlagi et al. 2019a, Ashlagi et al. 2019b) or a
compatibility network (Ashlagi et al. 2013, Anderson et al. 2017, Akbarpour et al. 2019,
Varma et al. 2019) essentially lead to dichotomous outcomes for a match. Exceptions include
U¨nver (2010), who considers blood type compatibility for a dynamic kidney exchange model,
Emek et al. 2016 and Ashlagi et al. 2017a, who consider minimizing mismatch costs when
agents arrive on a finite metric space in a non-bipartite and bipartite setting, respectively,
and Ashlagi et al. 2018, who allow general matching utilities in a discrete time model with a
constant time until abandonment. They perform a primal-dual analysis to derive competitive
ratios for algorithms when there is no prior information about the match values or arrival
times.
Some closely related studies are Hu and Zhou (2016), Bu¨ke and Chen (2017) and Liu et
al. (2015). Hu and Zhou (2016) consider a discrete-time, multiclass, discounted variant of our
problem that includes waiting costs. They show that the optimal policy is of threshold form
under vertical and unidirectionally horizontal differentiated types. The other two studies
consider fluid and diffusion limits of simplified versions of our model where either a match
occurs with a certain probability for each buyer-seller pair (Bu¨ke and Chen 2017) or everyone
matches when there is an available mate, which corresponds to our greedy policy, but with a
deterministic utility (i.e., a matching utility distribution that is a point mass at one value).
In both cases, the system state reduces to a one-dimensional quantity (the number of sellers
minus the number of buyers), whereas our model requires a two-dimensional state space for
a non-greedy policy.
Perhaps the most closely related paper is Mertikopoulos et al. (2020), which also
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considers a symmetric centralized dynamic matching market. Compared to our study, they
assume independent exponential mismatch costs rather than general matching utilities, and
consider waiting times rather than abandonment, and are interested in minimizing the sum
of mismatch and waiting costs over a finite horizon. They consider a class of policies that
make the kth match (which has the lowest mismatch cost among possible matches) when
the short side of the market grows to a certain one-parameter function of k. They analyze
the performance of the policy (using the celebrated π2/6 result for the expected minimum
weight matching due to Mezard and Parisi (1987) and rigorously proved by Aldous (2001))
under various values of the parameter, and also identify a policy that balances the mismatch
and waiting costs.
We briefly mention other work that is only peripherally related. Originally motivated
by public housing (Kaplan 1988), Caldentey et al. (2009) and Adan and Weiss (2012)
consider infinite bipartite matching of servers and customers under the first-come first-served
policy. Ding et al. (2016) allows the matching utilities to depend on the class of buyer and
seller, and performs a fluid analysis of a greedy policy, and Bu˘sic´ and Meyn (2016) minimize
linear holding costs in a system without class-dependent matching utilities or abandonment,
but also find that matches are not made until there are a sufficient number of agents in
the market; see Moyal and Perry (2017), where these systems are referred to as matching
queues, for other references to these types of models. Gurvich and Ward (2014) study a
control problem in a more general setting where arriving customers wait to be matched to
agents of other classes. All these studies assume a finite number of classes. There is also
a stream of work in online bipartite matching in an adversarial setting (Karp et al. 1990),
where agents do not wait in the market if they are not matched immediately.
We formulate the model in §2 and state our main theoretical results in §3, which are
proved in §9. After analyzing a greedy policy in §4, we apply our main results to specific
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matching utility distributions in §5 and assess the accuracy of these results in a simulation
study in §6. The unbalanced case is analyzed in §7 and concluding remarks are offered in §8.
2 The Model
Dynamics. Buyers and sellers arrive to the market according to independent Poisson pro-
cesses with rate λ. The agents are impatient, in that each buyer and each seller independently
abandons the market after an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) exponential
amount of time with rate η if they are not matched within this time. If an agent is matched
prior to his abandonment then the agent leaves at the time of matching.
Let B(t) and S(t) be the number of buyers and sellers in the system at time t; these
agents have arrived but have not yet abandoned or been matched. The utility of a match
between any buyer and any seller is a random variable V ≥ 0 with cumulative distribution
function (CDF) F (v). When a buyer (seller, respectively) arrives to this centralized system
to find it in state (B(t), S(t)) then S(t) (B(t), respectively) instances of V are observed by
the system manager, which represent the matching utilities of the arriving agent with all
currently available potential mates. Thus, at any point in time the system manager knows
the utility that would be generated by matching any buyer to any seller.
Policies. Our goal is to maximize the long run expected average rate of utility from
matches, which we refer to as the utility rate. While the system manager could conceivably
make matches at any point in time, we restrict our attention to arrival-only policies, where a
match may occur only at the arrival epoch of one of the agents being matched. In particular,
we consider the following two classes of arrival-only policies.
1. Population threshold policies: A buyer who arrives at time t is matched immediately
to a seller if the number of sellers in the system satisfies S(t) > z; in this case, the
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arriving buyer is matched to the seller who has the highest matching utility with the
buyer, with ties broken arbitrarily. If S(t) ≤ z, then the arriving buyer waits in the
market, and leaves upon being matched to a later-arriving seller or upon abandonment.
Similarly, a seller who arrives at time t is immediately matched to the highest-matching
buyer if B(t) > z, and waits otherwise. We refer to the parameter z as the population
threshold.
2. Utility threshold policies: A buyer who arrives at time t is matched immediately to
the seller with matching value argmax1≤i≤S(t) Vi if max1≤i≤S(t) Vi > v for some fixed
v ≥ 0, with ties broken arbitrarily. If max1≤i≤S(t) Vi ≤ v, then the arriving buyer
waits in the market, and leaves upon being matched to a later-arriving seller or upon
abandonment. Similarly, a seller who arrives at time t is immediately matched to the
buyer with matching value argmax1≤i≤B(t) Vi if max1≤i≤B(t) Vi > v, and waits otherwise.
We refer to the parameter v as the utility threshold.
Although possibly not optimal among all policies, these single-parameter policies are
easy to implement and describe, and allow for quite explicit results. In fact, the popula-
tion threshold policy can be implemented without ever calculating the utility of individual
matches (although the probability distribution of matches is required to compute the optimal
threshold): all that is required is a ranked ordering of the possible matches.
Utilities. In our model, the utilities of potential matches of a new arrival with agents on
the other side of the market may be correlated. However, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 There exists a sequence of distributions F1, F2, . . . such that Fk−1 ≤st Fk
for each k and, for an arriving agent who finds k agents on the other side of the market,
max{V1, . . . , Vk} is independent of the past, and has distribution Fk.
For example, if the utilities of different matches are i.i.d. with distribution F then
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Fk (x) = (F (x))
k.
Let the random variable M(k) , max{V1, . . . , Vk} have distribution Fk. We impose
the following assumption on M(k).
Assumption 2 For each x ∈ R+, define
m (x) = E (M (⌈x⌉)) ,
and suppose that m (·) is regularly varying with index α ∈ [0, 1). That is, for every x > 0,
lim
t→∞
m (tx)
m (t)
= xα. (1)
A regularly varying function with index α = 0 is also known as slowly varying.
For the case of i.i.d. utilities, Assumption 2 covers every utility distribution such that
E
(
V 1+δ
)
< ∞ for some δ > 0. All distributions that belong to the maximum domain of
attraction of a generalized extreme value distribution – which unifies the Type I (Gumbel),
Type II (Frechet) and Type III (Weibull) laws within a single parametric family – satisfy
(1) (including, e.g., uniform, beta, gamma, lognormal, Pareto). There are also other distri-
butions that do not belong to any domain of attraction in extreme value theory for which
(1) holds; e.g., the geometric, negative binomial, and Poisson distributions satisfy (1) with
α = 0. For ease of reference, we collect some basic facts about extreme value theory and
regularly varying functions in §10.
The case α = 0 corresponds to distributions for which all moments exist (i.e., the tail
of V decays faster than any polynomial), whereas α > 0 corresponds to the case in which
the tails of V decrease roughly like a polynomial with degree 1/α. The condition that α < 1
is imposed to guarantee that E
(
V 1+δ
)
< ∞ for some δ > 0. We will refer to α = 0 as the
light-tailed case and α ∈ (0, 1) as the heavy-tailed case.
Scaling. To make further progress, we consider a sequence of systems indexed by
n = 1, 2, . . .. The arrival rate in the nth system is nλ, and the abandonment rate in the
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nth system is η. Alternatively and equivalently, we could leave the arrival rate unscaled and
slow down the abandonment rate by a factor of n, as in Liu et al. (2015). The matching
utilities are unscaled. In the nth system, we denote the system state by (Bn(t), Sn(t)), the
population threshold by zn, the utility threshold by vn, and the utility rate by Un.
3 Main Results
Results for the population threshold policy and the utility threshold policy are given in
Theorem 1 in §3.1 and in Theorem 2 in §3.2, respectively. Theorem 1 shows that the
optimal population threshold policy is asymptotically optimal among the class of arrival-
only policies when α = 0, and derives the optimal population threshold when α ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 2 derives the optimal utility threshold when α ∈ (0, 1). The proofs of Theorems 1
and 2 appear in §9.
3.1 Population Threshold Policy
We begin by providing a dynamic description of the system using Poisson processes. Denote
the indicator function of event x by I{x} and let N
+
B (·) , N−B (·) , N+S (·) , N−S (·) be indepen-
dent Poisson processes with unit rate, which are used to construct buyer arrivals, buyer
abandonments, seller arrivals and seller abandonments, respectively. Under the population
threshold policy with threshold zn, the system state (Bn, Sn) satisfies
Bn (t) = Bn (0) +
∫ t
0
I{Sn(r−)<zn}dN
+
B (λnr)−N−B
(
η
∫ t
0
Bn (r) dr
)
−
∫ t
0
I{Bn(r−)≥zn}dN
+
S (λnr) , (2)
Sn (t) = Sn (0) +
∫ t
0
I{Bn(r−)<zn}dN
+
S (λnr)−N−S
(
η
∫ t
0
Sn (r) dr
)
−
∫ t
0
I{Sn(r−)≥zn}dN
+
B (λnr) . (3)
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By symmetry and because the process {Bn(t), Sn(t), t ≥ 0} is ergodic, the utility rate
Upn(zn) of the population threshold policy with threshold zn can be expressed as
Upn(zn) = λnE
[
m (Bn (∞)) I{Bn(∞)≥zn}
]
+ λnE
[
m (Sn (∞)) I{Sn(∞)≥zn}
]
,
= 2λnE
[
m (Bn (∞)) I{Bn(∞)≥zn}
]
. (4)
The theorem below shows that for α = 0, the population threshold policy is asymp-
totically optimal among the family of arrival-only policies. Also, for each α ∈ [0, 1), it
characterizes the scaling of the optimal population threshold, i.e., the threshold zn that
maximizes the utility rate asymptotically as n→∞.
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds.
i) If α = 0 then there exists an o(n) sequence of population thresholds z∗n such that
limn→∞
m(n)
m(z∗n)
= 1. For any such sequence of thresholds, the population threshold policy is
asymptotically optimal in the following sense. Let Upn(z
∗
n) and Un be the utility rates under
the above policy and any other arrival-only policy, respectively. Then lim infn→∞
Upn(z
∗
n)
Un
≥ 1.
The associated utility rate satisfies
lim
n→∞
Upn(z
∗
n)
nm(n)
= λ. (5)
ii) If α ∈ (0, 1) then the population threshold policy with z∗n = z∗n where z∗ = λαη(1+α)
is asymptotically optimal among the class of population threshold policies. The associated
utility rate satisfies
lim
n→∞
Upn(z
∗
n)
nm(n)
= λzα∗
(
1− ηz∗
λ
)
. (6)
For α = 0, it remains to compute a o(n) sequence of thresholds z∗n such that limn→∞
m(n)
m(z∗n)
=
1. This is usually not difficult to do. For example, when utilities are i.i.d. with an exponen-
tial distribution, then z∗n =
n
lnn
satisfies this property. More generally, as shown in Theorem
1 in Bojanic and Seneta (1971), for a large class of distributions, setting z∗n =
n
m(n)δ
for any
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positive real δ is sufficient. By setting zn in this way (i.e., o(n) but not too small), we simul-
taneously ensure the following: (1) the fraction of agents that abandon the system tends to
0, and (2) the market thickness, i.e. Bn(∞), is almost linear in n. In other words, almost
all agents experience maximal utility. This can be seen most clearly in equation (5), where
the utility rate under the optimal population threshold policy satisfies Upn(z
∗
n) ∼ nλm(n),
which is the arrival rate of buyers times the expected value of the maximum of n matching
utilities.
However, for heavy-tailed distributions in part ii of Theorem 1, m(zn) for any o(n)
sequence zn is vanishingly small compared to m(n). Thus, it is not possible to ensure
that most users see maximal utility, implying that our simple upper bound is unachievable.
Moreover, to maximize the utility rate, it is not obvious whether the system manager should
set zn = o(n) to guarantee that most agents are matched instantly, or should set zn = O(n)
to ensure that market thickness is maximal even if a nontrivial fraction of users abandon
the system. Part ii of Theorem 1 implies that the latter option is the right choice under
heavy-tailed distributions.
We conclude this subsection with a few comments about the proof of Theorem 1,
which relies on a fluid analysis of equations (2)-(3). We define B¯n(t) = n
−1Bn(t) and
S¯n(t) = n
−1Sn(t) and let zn = nz, and show that {(B¯n(t), S¯n(t)), t ≥ 0} converges to
{(B¯(t), S¯(t)), t ≥ 0} as n → ∞, which satisfies a dynamical system that is studied as the
solution to a certain Skorokhod problem. Finally, we show that the equilibrium point for
this system is (z, z), and prove that (B¯n(∞), S¯n(∞)) converges to (z, z) as n → ∞. This
analysis, along with the following key lemma, which is proved in §9, allows us to compute
the utility rate in (4) and derive z∗ in part ii of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 Let {Nn}n≥1 be a sequence of positive random variables taking values on the posi-
tive integers and let N¯n = E (Nn) <∞. Assume that N¯n →∞, and that P
(∣∣Nn − N¯n∣∣ > εN¯n)→
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0. Then E [m (Nn)] ∼ m
(
N¯n
)
as n→∞.
Asymptotic optimality in part i of Theorem 1 is proved by constructing the following
simple upper bound (see §9 for a proof of Lemma 2) on the performance of any arrival-
only policy, which uses Lemma 1 and assumes that all agents are matched and that – when
computing Bn(∞) in equation (4) – agents leave only upon abandonment (implying that
Bn(∞) ∼ Poi(λn/η)).
Lemma 2 Let Un be the utility rate for any arrival-only policy. Then an upper bound U
+
n
is given by
Un ≤ U+n = λnm
(
λn
η
)
.
3.2 Utility Threshold Policy
Because the population threshold policy is asymptotically optimal within the class of arrival-
only policies when α = 0, we focus on the case α ∈ (0, 1) in Theorem 2. In order to
describe the dynamics of the utility threshold policy, we introduce two independent arrays
of nonnegative i.i.d. random variables,
{
V Bi,j : i ≥ 1, j ≥ 1
}
and
{
V Si,j : i ≥ 1, j ≥ 1
}
having
CDF F (·). We let {ABj : j ≥ 1} be the sequence of arrival times associated with the process
N+B (nλ·) and
{
ASj : j ≥ 1
}
be the sequence of arrival times associated with the process
N+S (nλ·). The dynamics can be described path-by-path as follows:
Bn (t) = Bn (0) +
N+B (nλt)∑
j=1
I
{max
Sn(ABj−)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v}
−
N+S (nλt)∑
j=1
I
{max
Bn(A
S
j−
)
i=1 V
S
i,j>v}
(7)
−N−B
(
η
∫ t
0
Bn (r−) dr
)
,
Sn (t) = Sn (0) +
N+S (nλt)∑
j=1
I
{max
Bn(A
S
j−
)
i=1 V
S
i,j≤v}
−
N+B (nλt)∑
j=1
I
{max
Sn(A
B
j−
)
i=1 V
B
i,j>v}
−N−S
(
η
∫ t
0
Sn (r) dr
)
.
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By symmetry and ergodicity, we can express the utility rate Uun (vn) for the utility
threshold policy with threshold vn as
Uun (vn) = 2λnE
[
E[M(Bn(∞))I{M(Bn(∞))≥vn}|Bn (∞)]
]
. (8)
Because the analysis of the utility threshold policy considers the entire distribution of
the maximum rather than only its expected value, we need to strengthen Assumption 2 by
imposing the following additional assumption.
Assumption 3 In addition to Assumption 2, suppose that α ∈ (0, 1) and
M(n)
m(n)
⇒ Z as n→∞,
where P (Z > t) = 1− e−κ/t1/α and κ is a normalizing constant such that E (Z) = 1.
Assumption 3 is satisfied if the utilities belong to the domain of attraction of the
Frechet law, which in turn is equivalent, in the i.i.d. case, to requiring the distribution of
utilities to be regularly varying with index 1/α.
Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. For z ∈ [0, λ/η], define
v (z) =
 κz
ln
(
2λ
ηz+λ
)
α
and consider the unique solution z∗ ∈ (0, λ/η) satisfying
z1−α∗ v (z∗)
η
2λακα
=
∫ κz∗/v(z∗)1/α
0
t−αe−tdt.
Then a threshold policy with utility threshold v∗n = v (z∗)m (n) is optimal among the class of
utility threshold policies. The associated utility rate satisfies
lim
n→∞
Uun (v
∗
n)
nm(n)
= 2λzα∗E
[
ZI{Z≥ v(z∗)
zα
∗
}
]
.
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As in the population threshold policy, the above result shows that for heavy-tailed
distributions it is beneficial to ensure that market thickness is maximal at the cost of aban-
donment of a nontrivial fraction of users in the system. Although we do not prove any
results for the utility threshold policy in the α = 0 case (since asymptotic optimality is
already achieved for the population threshold policy), we show in §5 how heuristics inspired
by Theorems 1 and 2 can lead to effective utility thresholds in the α = 0 case.
The proof of Theorem 2 uses the same general approach as in the proof of Theorem 1
part ii. Although the results in Theorem 2 are less explicit than those in part ii of Theorem 1,
the proof is slightly easier because one can work with the putative fluid limit directly and use
results in Ethier and Kurtz (2005), since this system does not pose the degeneracies involving
the Skorokhod map encountered in the case of Theorem 1 part ii. Readers interested in the
basics of the analysis without the proof are referred to §7, where we provide an informal
analysis of the utility threshold policy for unbalanced markets.
4 A Greedy Policy
In §5, we apply the results in Theorems 1 and 2 to several different matching utility distribu-
tions, and then assess the accuracy of these analyses in §6. To provide a natural benchmark
for comparison, we first analyze the greedy policy, which corresponds to the population
threshold policy with threshold zn = 0. That is, under the greedy policy, each arriving agent
is matched to the available mate with the highest matching utility, and waits in the market
if there are no available mates.
Under the greedy policy, the state of the nth system can be described by Bn(t) −
Sn(t) because there are never both buyers and sellers in the system at the same time. By
Theorem 4.5 in Liu et al. (2015), the steady-state distribution of Bn(t)−Sn(t)√
n
converges to
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N(0, λ/η) as n→∞.
The probability that a buyer or seller abandons is the long-run expected number of
abandonments per unit time divided by the total arrival rate of agents (i.e., buyers plus
sellers), which can be approximated by
√
nηE[|N(0, λ/η)|]
2λn
=
√
nη
√
2
π
λ
η
2λn
,
=
1√
2πn
, (9)
→ 0. (10)
By (10), the match rate for the greedy policy converges to nλ as n→∞.
When a match occurs (i.e., when there is at least one available mate upon an agent’s
arrival), the expected number of available mates when an agent arrives can be approximated
by
√
nE[N(0, λ/η)|N(0, λ/η) > 0] by symmetry,
=
λ
η
√
2n
π
. (11)
By (10)-(11) and Lemma 1, the utility rate of the greedy policy, which is denoted by Ugn ,
satisfies
Ugn ∼ nλm
(
λ
η
√
2n
π
)
. (12)
5 Examples
In §5.1-5.3, we consider one canonical matching utility distribution from each of the three
domains of attraction (Weibull, Gumbel and Frechet), represented, respectively, by U(a, b),
exp(ν), and Pareto(c, β). In each of these examples, we compute the utility rate of the upper
bound in Lemma 2, the utility rate under the greedy policy from (12), and the asymptoti-
cally optimal (or heuristic, in some cases) thresholds and corresponding utility rates for the
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population threshold policy and the utility threshold policy from Theorems 1 and 2, respec-
tively. We continue to add the superscripts +, g, p and u to U to denote the utility rate of
the upper bound, the greedy policy, the population threshold policy and the utility thresh-
old policy, respectively. We briefly consider matching utilities that come from a correlated
Pareto distribution in §5.4.
5.1 Matching Utilities are Exponential
Let the matching utilities be exponential with parameter ν and CDF F (v) = 1 − e−νv for
v ≥ 0, which falls under the α = 0 case in Theorem 1. The exponential is in the domain
of attraction of Type I, and so (see (109)-(110) in §10) µ = γ = 0.5772 . . ., which is Euler’s
constant, an =
1
ν
and bn =
lnn
ν
, and hence m(n) ∼ (γ + lnn)/ν.
The utility rate of the upper bound is
U+n ∼
λn
ν
(
γ + ln
(
nλ
η
))
by Lemma 2, (13)
∼ λ
ν
n lnn, (14)
and the utility rate of the greedy policy is
Ugn ∼
λn
ν
(
γ + ln
(
λ
η
√
2n
π
))
by (12), (15)
∼ λ
2ν
n lnn. (16)
As noted below Theorem 1, a range of population thresholds are asymptotically optimal
in the α = 0 case. For concreteness, we consider z∗n =
n
lnn
, which has utility rate
Upn
(
n
lnn
)
∼ λn
ν
(
γ + ln
(
n
lnn
))
by (5), (17)
∼ λ
ν
n lnn. (18)
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By (53), (56) and (57), the population threshold policy with threshold n
lnn
is asymptotically
optimal and doubles the utility rate of the greedy policy in the limit.
Recall that Theorem 2 does not apply to the α = 0 case. Nonetheless, we apply the
ideas in Theorems 1 and 2 to derive a heuristic threshold level for the utility threshold policy.
By considering the steady-state version of equation (94) and differentiating, we obtain
ηBn(∞)
λn
= P (M(Sn(∞)) ≤ vn)− (1− P (M(Bn(∞)) ≤ vn)) ,
which by symmetry yields
ηBn(∞)
λn
= 2P (M(Bn(∞)) ≤ vn)− 1. (19)
Now we heuristically assume that the utility threshold vn is such that it achieves a population
level Bn(∞) that equals the optimal population threshold z∗n, which for concreteness we
again take to be n
lnn
. Substituting n
lnn
for Bn(∞) in (19) and noting that P (M(n) ≤ vn) =
P (µM(n)− lnn ≤ µvn − lnn) ∼ exp(− exp(−µvn + lnn)) by (105), we get
η
λ lnn
= 2 exp
[
− exp
(
−νv + ln
( n
lnn
))]
− 1. (20)
Solving equation (20) gives the proposed threshold level,
v∗n =
lnn− ln lnn− ln ln
(
2λ lnn
λ lnn+η
)
ν
. (21)
This heuristic approach does not generate a corresponding utility rate.
5.2 Matching Utilities are Pareto With Finite Mean
Let the matching utilities have CDF F (v) = 1− (cv)−β, for β > 1, c > 0 and cv ≥ 1, so that
the mean matching utility is finite and α = 1/β in Theorem 1. The Pareto distribution is
in the domain of attraction of the Frechet distribution, and hence (see (109)-(110) in §10)
bn = 0, an = (cn)
1/β and µ = Γ
(
1− 1
β
)
, where Γ(n) is the gamma function. It follows that
m(n) ∼ (cn)1/βΓ
(
1− 1
β
)
. (22)
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By Lemma 2 and (12),
U+n ∼ λ
(cλ
η
)1/β
Γ
(
1− 1
β
)
n1+1/β , (23)
and
Ugn ∼ λ
(cλ
η
√
2
π
)1/β
Γ
(
1− 1
β
)
n1+1/(2β). (24)
Because α = 1/β, part ii of Theorem 1 implies that
z∗n =
λ
η(1 + β)
n. (25)
That is, the optimal threshold equals the mean size of either side of the market in the absence
of matching (λn/η) times the factor 1
1+β
, which is less than 1/2. Substituting (62) into (6)
gives the utility rate
Upn(z
∗
n) ∼ λ
( cλ
η(1 + β)
)1/β ( β
1 + β
)
Γ
(
1− 1
β
)
n1+1/β . (26)
Comparing the utility rate under the optimal population threshold policy to the upper
bound, we get
U+n
Upn(z∗n)
=
1(
1
1+β
)1/β (
β
1+β
) , (27)
which converges to 4 as β → 1, and converges to 1 as β →∞.
Comparing the utility rate of the optimal population threshold policy to the utility
rate of the greedy policy yields
Upn(z
∗
n)
Ugn
=
( √
π√
2(1 + β)
)1/β (
β
1 + β
)
n1/(2β), (28)
which converges to
√
πn
32
≈ 0.3133√n as β → 1, and converges to 1 as β →∞. For all finite
values of β, the difference in performance between the two policies becomes unbounded as
n→∞.
The optimal utility threshold needs to be computed numerically using the results in
Theorem 2. To streamline the presentation, we consider the special case considered in the
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simulation experiments in §6, where λ = η = 1, c = 1 and β = 2, and hence α = 0.5,
κ = 1/π and m(n) =
√
πn. Using the fact that the incomplete gamma function γ(0.5, x) =
√
πerf(
√
x), by Theorem 2 we need to find the solution z∗ ∈ (0, λ/η) satisfying
z√
π ln
(
2
z+1
) = erf
(√
ln
( 2
z + 1
))
. (29)
Given the solution z∗ to (29), Theorem 2 and its proof imply that
v∗n =
√
nz∗
ln
(
2
z∗+1
) (30)
and
Uun (v
∗
n) ∼
2(nz∗)3/2√
ln
(
2
z∗+1
) . (31)
5.3 Matching Utilities are Uniform
When the matching utilities are distributed as U(a, b) with F (v) = v−a
b−a for v ∈ [a, b], which
is in the domain of attraction of the Weibull law, we have (see (109)-(110) in §10) an = b−an ,
bn = b, µ = −Γ(2) = −1, m(n) ∼ b− b−an , and α = 0 in Theorem 1. By Lemma 2 and (12),
U+n ∼ nλ
(
b− b− a
λ
η
n
)
, (32)
∼ λbn, (33)
and
Ugn ∼ nλ
(
b− b− a
λ
η
√
2n
π
)
, (34)
∼ λbn. (35)
By (33) and (35), the greedy policy is asymptotically optimal, and so there is no need to
consider a positive threshold level for the population threshold policy.
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To heuristically analyze the utility threshold policy, we proceed as in §5.1, where equa-
tion (19) now becomes
ηBn(∞)
λn
= 2
(
vn − a
b− a
)Bn(∞)
− 1, (36)
which can be rearranged as
vn = a+ (b− a)
(
ηBn(∞)
2λn
+
1
2
)1/Bn(∞)
.
Setting Bn(∞) = λη
√
2n
π
from (11), which is the expected number of available mates for an
arriving agent under the greedy policy, leads to
v∗n = a + (b− a)
(
1√
2nπ
+
1
2
) η
λ
√
pi
2n
. (37)
5.4 Matching Utilities are Correlated
In this subsection, we demonstrate via an example how our analysis can be leveraged to
study systems where the matching utilities associated with an arriving agent (one for each
possible mate) are correlated. More specifically, suppose that when a seller (buyer) arrives
and finds k buyers (sellers), the corresponding utilities V1, V2, . . . , Vk are given by
Vi = ρU0 +
√
1− ρ2Ui for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, (38)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1), and U0, U1, . . . , Uk are i.i.d. with a Pareto( 2√3 , 3) distribution; i.e., for each
i we have P (Ui ≤ u) = 1− ( 2√3u)3 for u ≥ 2√3 , and 0 otherwise. The variance of each Vi is 1,
independent of ρ. However, for ρ > 0, Cov(Vi, Vj) = ρ
2 for each i 6= j, and the utilities have
correlation ρ2.
Before computing the optimal thresholds and the corresponding utility rates for the
population threshold policy and the utility threshold policy, we show that Assumptions 2-
3 hold. We have m(k) = ρE[U0] +
√
1− ρ2E[maxki=1 Ui] ∼
√
1− ρ2Γ(1 − 1
β
)k1/β , and
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M(k)
m(k)
=
ρU0+
√
1−ρ2maxki=1 Ui
m(k)
∼ maxki=1 Ui
E[maxki=1 Ui]
w.p.1, which implies that Assumptions 2 and 3 are
satisfied with α = 1/3.
By Theorem 1, the asymptotically optimal population threshold is z∗n =
λα
η(1+α)
n, in-
dependent of ρ, and the asymptotic utility rate is proportional to
√
1− ρ2. By Theorem 2,
the asymptotically optimal utility threshold is v∗n =
√
1− ρ2Γ(1 − 1
β
)v∗n1/β where v∗ is as
given in the theorem statement, and the corresponding utility rate is increasing in
√
1− ρ2.
Hence, in both case, the utility rate decreases as the correlation ρ2 increases. However,
the optimal population threshold is independent of ρ2 and the optimal utility threshold is
decreasing in ρ2. The optimal population threshold is independent of ρ2 because it trades
off the higher utility from additional thickness (i.e., increased zn), which depends on the
variation in (U1, . . . , Uk), and the higher abandonment rate, which is independent of ρ
2.
It is also possible to apply our techniques to incorporate scenarios where the correlation
scales with the number of potential matches, k. For example, suppose the matching utilities
for an arriving agent are
Vi = 2
−1/β max(ckW,Ui) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, (39)
where U1, . . . , Uk are i.i.d. with a Pareto(1, β) distribution with β > 1, W is an independent
Frechet(β) distributed random variable, and ck = k
1/βΓ(1 − 1
β
) for each k. Assumptions 2
and 3 are satisfied with α = 1/β, and thus our results apply. In fact, even when W has a
distribution that is different than Frechet(β), while Assumption 3 may not hold as is, our
proof techniques may be leveraged to compute optimal thresholds. We omit the details for
the sake of brevity.
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6 Simulation Results
To assess the accuracy of our asymptotic results, we consider special cases of the three
canonical examples in §5: exp(1), Pareto(1,2) and U[0,1]. For all cases, we let λ = η = 1 and
n = 1000, so that the mean number of buyers and sellers in a match-free system is 1000. We
initialize the system with 1000 buyers and 1000 sellers, simulate the system for 1500 time
units, discarding the first 150 time units, and then repeat this procedure 100 times.
To find the optimal population threshold levels, we compute the utility rate for the
population threshold policy for each integer threshold value in the range [0,1000], using the
same set of random numbers for each threshold level. We repeat the same procedure for the
utility threshold policy, and discretize the utility threshold values by 0.1 for the exp(1) and
Pareto(1,2) cases, and by 0.01 for the U[0,1] case.
Exponential(1) case. In the exponential case, we predict that the optimal population thresh-
old level is z∗n =
1000
ln 1000
= 144.8, and the utility rate under this threshold policy approaches
the upper bound and is twice as large as the utility rate of the greedy policy (see §5.1).
The optimal threshold level found via simulation is 148, and the suboptimality of the utility
rate under the threshold 144.8 vs. the threshold 148 is 0.004% (Table 2). Our heuristic
utility threshold is v∗n = 5.56 from (21), which coincides with the optimal threshold found
via simulation (with a discretization of 0.1) of 5.6.
However, the predicted utility rates are less accurate than our determination of the best
threshold levels. By (17), our best estimate for the utility rate under the optimal population
threshold policy is 5553, which is 14.9% higher than the simulated value in Table 2. By (9)
and (15), our best estimate of the utility rate under the greedy policy is
Ugn ≈
λn
ν
(
1− 1√
2πn
)(
γ + ln
(
λ
η
√
2n
π
))
,
= 3757,
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which is 8.5% higher than the simulated value in Table 2. Our best estimate of the upper
bound is given in (13), which yields 7485. The optimal-to-greedy ratio of the simulated
utility rates is 4833
3462
= 1.40 rather than 2. Further simulations reveal that convergence is
very slow: this simulated ratio is 1.48 when n = 104 and 1.54 when n = 105. Most of the
inaccuracy in estimating the optimal-to-greedy ratio is due to the fact that the simulated
utility rate of the optimal threshold policy is not very close to the upper bound.
Finally, the utility rate of the optimal utility threshold policy is 5732 (Table 3). While
still far from the upper bound, it is 18.6% higher than the utility rate achieved by the optimal
population threshold policy.
Pareto(1,2) case. In the Pareto case, we predict that the optimal population threshold level
is 1000
3
= 333.3. The optimal population threshold found via simulation is 347, and the
utility suboptimality of the theoretical threshold is 0.03% (Table 2). The solution to (29)
is z∗ = 0.512. Hence, the optimal utility threshold level in (30) is v∗n = 42.8, which is very
close to the value of 42.0 found via simulation.
Our estimate of the utility rate under the optimal population threshold policy is 21,573
by (26), which is 2.4% less than the simulated value of 22,102 in Table 2. The optimal utility
rate in (31) is Un =43,756, which is nearly identical to the optimal simulated value of 43,750.
Our best estimate for the utility rate of the greedy policy is
(
1− 1√
2πn
)
times the right side
of (60), or 8791, which is 6.4% larger than the simulated value in Table 2. Our estimate of
the upper bound in (59) is 56,050. By (28), the predicted performance ratio between the
optimal population threshold policy and the greedy policy is 2
3
(
1000π
18
)1/4
= 2.42, compared
to the optimal-to-greedy simulated ratio of 22,102
8259
= 2.68 (Table 2). By (27), the ratio of the
upper bound to the utility rate of the optimal population threshold policy is predicted to be
3
√
3
2
= 2.60, compared to the simulated value of 56,050
22,102
= 2.54.
The simulated utility rate of the optimal utility threshold policy is nearly twice as large
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as the simulated utility rate of the optimal population threshold policy (Table 3), although
it is still 21.9% smaller than the predicted upper bound of 56,050.
Uniform(0,1) case. In the uniform case, we predict that the greedy policy is asymptotically
optimal. The optimal population threshold level found via simulation is 22, and the resulting
utility suboptimality of the greedy policy is 4.0% (Table 2). Note that other population
thresholds aside from zero are also asymptotically optimal in this case, including ln(n) =
ln(1000) = 6.91, which has a suboptimality of 2.0%. Our best estimate of the utility rate
under the greedy policy is
(
1 − 1√
2πn
)
times the right side of (34), or 948.2, which is 4.4%
larger than the simulated value in Table 2. The upper bound in (32) equals 987.4, which is
4.3% larger than the utility rate corresponding to the optimal population threshold level of
22. The predicted optimal utility threshold from equation (37) is v∗n = 0.974, compared to
the the value of 0.96 found via simulation, for a utility suboptimality of 0.24% (Table 3).
In summary, our analysis identifies the optimal threshold level within about 2% (con-
sidering the possible range of [0,1000]) and its suboptimality is no more than 2% for the
population threshold policy in the uniform case, and is negligible in the other five cases. We
also note that the predicted fraction of agents who abandon the market under the optimal
population threshold policy, which is 2zn
2λn
= 1
lnn
= 0.145 (i.e., the total abandonment rate
divided by the total arrival rate) in the exponential case, z
∗
n
n
= 1
3
in the Pareto case by (62),
and 1 − 1√
2πn
= 0.013 in the uniform case by (9), are reasonably close to the simulated
values in the fourth column of Table 3. As predicted by our analysis, the utility rate of the
greedy policy – normalized by the mean of the matching distribution – increases with the
right tail of the matching distribution (this quantity is 1817 for the uniform, 3462 for the
exponential, and 4129 for the Pareto), as does the ratio of the utility rates between the best
threshold policy and the greedy policy (1.04 for the uniform, 1.40 for the exponential, and
2.68 for the Pareto under the population threshold policy, and 1.06, 1.66 and 5.30 under
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the utility threshold policy). In addition, despite the asymptotic optimality result, there is
a large gap between the utility rate of the best population threshold policy and the upper
bound in the exponential case. The improvement of the utility threshold policy over the
population threshold policy also increases with the right tail of the matching distribution,
with the ratio of the utility rates equaling 1.02, 1.19 and 1.98 for the uniform, exponential
and Pareto cases, respectively. This improvement is achieved by being more patient and
allowing more agents to abandon the market, particularly in the Pareto case (last column in
Table 3).
7 Unbalanced Markets
In this section, we consider unbalanced markets, where buyers and sellers arrive at rates nλb
and nλs in the n
th system, and abandon at rates ηb and ηs, respectively. We restrict ourselves
to the analysis of the utility threshold policy in the case α ∈ (0, 1), which is very similar
to the corresponding analysis in the symmetric case, although we do not provide rigorous
proofs in the unbalanced case. We also note that an analysis of the population threshold
policy in the unbalanced case is likely to be quite challenging, due to the associated two-
dimensional Skorokhod problem. Under the utility threshold policy in the nth system, an
arriving buyer is matched to the seller that yields the maximum utility if this utility exceeds
the threshold vn,s; similarly, an arriving seller is matched to its highest-matching buyer if
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the utility exceeds the threshold vn,b. The dynamics are given by the equations
Bn (t) = Bn (0) +
N+B (nλbt)∑
j=1
I{
max
Sn(ABj−)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤vn,s
} −
N+S (nλst)∑
j=1
I{
max
Bn(A
S
j−
)
i=1 V
S
i,j>vn,b
} (40)
−N−B
(
ηb
∫ t
0
Bn (r−) dr
)
,
Sn (t) = Sn (0) +
N+S (nλst)∑
j=1
I{
max
Bn(A
S
j−
)
i=1 V
S
i,j≤vn,b
} −
N+B (nλbt)∑
j=1
I{
max
Sn(A
B
j−
)
i=1 V
B
i,j>vn,s
} (41)
−N−S
(
ηs
∫ t
0
Sn (r) dr
)
,
where
{
ABj : j ≥ 1
}
is the sequence of arrival times associated withN+B (nλb·), and
{
ASj : j ≥ 1
}
is the sequence of arrival times associated with N+S (nλs·). As in the symmetric case, the
V Bi,js and V
S
i,js are independent arrays of i.i.d. random variables with distribution F (·).
We assume that the thresholds are suitably scaled so that
vn,b
m(n)
→ vb and vn,s
m(n)
→ vs for some vb, vs ≥ 0. (42)
Then, just as in the symmetric case, we consider the scaling B¯n(t) = n
−1Bn(t) and S¯n (t) =
n−1Sn(t) and send n→∞ in (40)-(41), obtaining the fluid limit
B¯ (t) = B¯ (0) + λb
∫ t
0
e−κS¯(r)/v
1/α
s − ηb
∫ t
0
B¯ (r) dr − λs
∫ t
0
(
1− e−κB¯(r)/v1/αb
)
dr, (43)
S¯ (t) = S¯ (0) + λs
∫ t
0
e−κB¯(r)/v
1/α
b − ηs
∫ t
0
S¯ (r) dr − λb
∫ t
0
(
1− e−κS¯(r)/v1/αs
)
dr. (44)
Any stationary solution to the fluid model in (43)-(44) must satisfy
ηbb+ λs = λbe
−κs/v1/αs + λse−κb/v
1/α
b ,
ηss+ λb = λbe
−κs/v1/αs + λse
−κb/v1/αb .
Moreover, following the development in the symmetric case (e.g. (8)), the utility rate takes
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the form
Uun (vn,b, vn,s) = nλbE
[
E[M (Sn (∞)) I{M(Sn(∞))≥vn,s}|Sn (∞)]
]
+nλsE
[
E[M (Bn (∞)) I{M(Bn(∞))≥vn,b}|Bn (∞)]
]
.
Consequently,
Uun (vn,b, vn,s)
nm(n)
∼ λbsαE
[
ZI{Z≥vs/sα}
]
+ λsb
αE
[
ZI{Z≥vb/bα}
]
as n→∞. (45)
Hence, we need to solve the optimization problem
max
vb≥0,vs≥0
λbs
αE
[
ZI{Z≥vs/sα}
]
+ λsb
αE
[
ZI{Z≥vb/bα}
]
(46)
subject to ηbb+ λs = λbe
−κs/v1/αs + λse−κb/v
1/α
b , (47)
ηss+ λb = λbe
−κs/v1/αs + λse
−κb/v1/αb . (48)
We solve (46)-(48) by reducing it to a one-dimensional optimization problem over a
compact interval using the following three-step procedure: make a change of variables, show
that vb = vs for any feasible pair (b, s), and solving for the optimal (b, s).
Step 1: The case of no matching, i.e., vb = vs =∞, provides an upper bound on the
system’s steady-state population of ρb =
λb
ηb
and ρs =
λs
ηs
. Hence, b ∈ [0, ρb] and s ∈ [0, ρs].
Recall by Assumption 3 that Z = (κ−1T )−α, where T is exponentially distributed with unit
mean. Defining
G (x) =
∫ x
0
t−αe−tdt
and using the change of variables
x =
κs
v
1/α
s
and y =
κb
v
1/α
b
, (49)
we use (89)-(90) to express problem (46)-(48) as
max
s,b∈(0,ρs)×(0,ρb),(x,y)∈R2+
λbs
αG (x) + λsb
αG (y) (50)
subject to λbe
−x + λse
−y = bηb + λs = sηs + λb. (51)
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Step 2: Suppose for now that b and s are fixed (and feasible) and we are optimizing
over (x, y) in (49). Because G (·) in (50) is strictly concave and increasing, problem (50)-(51)
is given by
max
(x,y)∈R2+
λbs
αG (x) + λsb
αG (y) , (52)
subject to λbe
−x + λse−y ≥ bηb + λs = sηs + λb, (53)
which is a convex optimization problem because the constraints in (53) form a convex set.
The optimality conditions for (52)-(53) are
λbs
αx−αe−x = βλbe−x,
λsb
αy−αe−y = βλse−y,
where β is a Lagrange multiplier, which yields
b
y
=
s
x
= β1/α.
The change of variables in (49) implies that
vb = vs. (54)
Step 3: Finally, define the change of variable
τ =
κ
v
1/α
b
, (55)
so that x = τs and y = τb. Assume without loss of generality that λb ≥ λs, which by (51)
implies that
b (s) =
sηs + λb − λs
ηb
. (56)
Substituting (56) into (51), we define τ (s) to be the unique solution to
λbe
−sτ + λse
−b(s)τ = sηs + λb (57)
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for any s ∈ (0, ρs) and b ∈ (0, ρs). Note that τ (s) is well defined because the left side of (57)
is decreasing in τ , given s and therefore b (s). Moreover, the left side of (57) is larger than
the right side when τ = 0 and the right side is larger than the left side if τ =∞.
Then the optimization problem (50)-(51) takes the form
max
s∈[0,ρs]
{
λbs
αG (sτ (s)) + λs
(
sηs + λb − λs
ηb
)α
G
((
sηs + λb − λs
ηb
)
τ (s)
)}
. (58)
Taken together, the asymptotically optimal thresholds in the nth system are
v∗n,b = v
∗
n,s =
(
κ
τ(s∗)
)α
m(n) (59)
by (42), (54) and (55), where s∗ is the solution to (58) and τ(s∗) is the unique solution to
λbe
−s∗τ + λs∗e−b(s
∗)τ = s∗ηs∗ + λb. (60)
By (45), (49), (59) and (90), the corresponding utility rate satisfies
Uun (v
∗
n,b, v
∗
n,s) ∼ nm(n)κα[λb[s∗]αG(s∗τ(s∗)) + λs[b(s∗)]αG(b(s∗)τ(s∗))] as n→∞. (61)
We conclude this section with a numerical example that is a variant of the one in §5.2:
let λb = 2, λs = 1, ηb = 1, ηs = 1, n = 1000, and assume a Pareto(1,2) distribution, so that
α = 1/2, κ = 1/π and m(n) =
√
1000π. Then b(s) = s+ 1 in (56), and (57) reduces to
2e−sτ + e−(s+1)τ = s+ 2. (62)
The solution to (58) is s∗ = 0.365 and τ(0.365) = 0.361, which yields v∗n,b = v
∗
n,s =
√
1000
0.361
=
52.7. Interestingly, this threshold level of 52.7 is higher than in the symmetric case, where
λb = 1 and v
∗
n = 42.8. Moreover, leaving all parameter values fixed except for λb, we
numerically compute v∗n,b in (59) and find that it is increasing and concave in λb ≥ 1.
With λb = 2, we simulate this system in the same manner as in §6. At a discretization
of 0.1, a two-dimensional search of (vn,b, vn,s) space via simulation for the optimal thresholds
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yields (52.7,52.3), with a corresponding simulated utility rate of 71,046 and with aban-
donment fractions of 0.681 for buyers and 0.363 for sellers. The simulated utility rate at
(v∗n,b, v
∗
n,s) = (52.7, 52.7) is 71,010, which is suboptimal by 0.05%. The predicted utility rate,
Uun (v
∗
n,b, v
∗
n,s) in (61), is 70,992, which is 0.03% less than the simulated value of 71,010.
8 Concluding Remarks
A fundamental tradeoff in centralized dynamic matching markets relates to market thickness:
whether matches should be delayed – at the risk of antagonizing waiting agents – in the
hope of obtaining better matches in the future. Very little is known about this issues when
matching utilities are general. By combining queueing asymptotics (as an aside, we note
that perhaps the most surprising part of our study is that rather than requiring a diffusion
analysis, a fluid analysis is sufficient to analyze this problem) with extreme value theory, we
obtain explicit results that shed light on this issue. For symmetric markets, as the right tail
of the matching utility distribution gets heavier, it is optimal to become more patient and let
the market thickness (and abandonment rate) increase. While empirical work on matching
markets use more complicated covariate models than what we consider (e.g., Hitsch et al.
2010, Boyd et al. 2013, Agarwal 2015), it seems clear from these analyses that matching
utilities typically are not in the domain of attraction of the Weibull law. Therefore, large
centralized matching markets – whether balanced or unbalanced (see below) – are likely to
benefit from allowing the market to thicken.
Our study appears to be the first to allow for correlated matching utilities, which is
likely to be a common phenomenon in practice: an agent who is deemed objectively attractive
in a labor, housing or school choice model is likely to have matching utilities with potential
mates that are positively correlated rather than i.i.d. In §5.4, we find that positive correlation
reduces the market thickness in the utility threshold policy but not the population threshold
32
policy, and reduces the utility rate under both policies.
We note three limitations in our study. First, we restrict ourselves to arrival-only
policies. In particular, it might be possible to do better by batching sets of agents and then
matching them, as in Mertikopoulos et al. (2020). However, if there are many agents who
abandon quickly after arrival, as in some call centers (e.g., Fig. 20 in Gans et al. 2003), a
batching policy may not be very robust in practice. Moreover, generalizing their results to
our setting is likely to be quite challenging, in that the π2/6 result requires an exponential
matching distribution and a minimum cost matching (they minimize mismatch plus waiting
costs rather than maximizing utility in the presence of abandonment). While they generalize
their results in §6 of their paper by positing a functional form for how the expected minimum
mismatch costs decrease as a function of the number of agents in the market, this functional
form does not appear to follow from any more primitive distributional assumptions.
Second, most of our analysis considers a symmetric market, with buyers and sellers
having the same arrival and abandonment rates. While some markets, such as cadaveric
organ transplants and public housing, tend to have chronic supply shortages, other markets
have economic forces at play that tend to roughly balance supply and demand. In a static
matching market, even a slight imbalance can give rise to a unique stable matching (Ashlagi
et al. 2017b). We also note that a greedy policy is optimal in a somewhat different unbal-
anced market setting, where easy-to-match agents can match with all other agents in the
market with a specified probability, but hard-to-match agents can match only with easy-to-
match agents with a different specified probability (Ashlagi et al. 2019b). In our analysis
of the utility threshold policy in the heavy-tailed case of an unbalanced market, we obtain
the somewhat surprising result that the solution is symmetric: i.e., the utility threshold is
the same for buyers and sellers. Moreover, we find (in our Pareto example) that the amount
of patience increases with the amount of imbalance; i.e., the larger the imbalance, the more
33
agents that are going to be turned away, and the more selective the matching becomes.
However, we leave a complete analysis of the unbalanced problem for future work.
The final restriction is exponential abandonment. Relaxing this assumption would
require a different approach, such as hazard rate scaling (Reed and Tezcan 2012), and would
likely be much more difficult.
Finally, we note that there may be equity issues if a significant number of agents are
allowed to abandon the market (Table 3). The consideration of a risk-sensitive objective func-
tion would likely require a diffusion approximation, which would be, e.g., a two-dimensional
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with an unusual Skorokhod condition under a population thresh-
old policy.
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Matching Utility Distribution
Policy Exponential(ν) Pareto (c, shape β > 1) Uniform(a, b)
Upper Bound U+n ∼ λνn lnn U+n = O(n1+1/β) U+n ∼ λbn
Greedy Policy Ugn ∼ λ2νn lnn Ugn = O(n1+1/(2β)) asymptotically optimal
Population z∗n =
n
lnn
is z∗n =
λ
η(1+β)
n z∗n = 0 is
Threshold asymptotically Upn(z
∗
n) = O(n
1+1/β) but no asymptotically optimal
Policy with optimal convergence to upper
threshold zn bound unless β →∞
Utility heuristic v∗n = v
∗
n = 1.353
√
n heuristic v∗n = a+
Threshold
lnn−ln lnn−ln ln( 2λ lnnλ lnn+η)
ν
when c = 1, β = 2; (b− a)
(
1√
2nπ
+ 1
2
) η
λ
√
pi
2n
Policy with
threshold vn U
u
n (v
∗
n) = O(n
1+1/β)
Table 1: Summary of results for the three canonical cases in §5. U+n , Ugn , Upn(zn) and Uun (vn) are
the upper bound on the utility rate for any arrival-only policy, the utility rate for the greedy
policy, the utility rate for the population threshold policy with threshold zn, and the utility
rate for the utility threshold policy with threshold vn, all for the n
th system. We use xn ∼ yn
as shorthand for xn
yn
→ 1 as n→∞.
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Optimal Population Threshold Simulated Utility Rate [95% CI]
Utility Theoretical Simulation Greedy
Distribution Theoretical Simulation Threshold Threshold Policy
Exponential(1) 144.8 148 4833 4833 3462
[4824,4840] [4827,4841] [3425,3503]
Pareto(1,2) 333.3 347 22,095 22,102 8259
[21,997,22,241] [21,972,22,234] [8107,8428]
Uniform(0,1) 0 22 908.4 946.3 908.4
[906.0,911.3] [945.1,947.7] [906.0,911.3]
Table 2: Theoretical and simulation results for the population threshold policy.
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Population Threshold Policy Utility Threshold Policy
Utility Optimal Utility Fraction Optimal Utility Fraction
Distribution Threshold Rate Abandoned Threshold Rate Abandoned
Exponential(1) 148 4833 0.140 5.6 5732 0.150
[4827,4841] [5724,5740]
Pareto(1,2) 347 22,102 0.334 42.0 43,750 0.503
[21,972,22,234] [43,541,43,960]
Uniform(0,1) 22 946.3 0.027 0.96 963.0 0.021
[945.1,947.7] [961.7,964.2]
Table 3: Simulation results for both threshold policies. Columns 2 and 3 are taken from Table 2.
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Appendix
9 Technical Proofs
Before we prove Theorems 1 and 2 in §9.2 and §9.3, we prove Lemmas 1 and 2, and state
and prove Lemmas 3 and 4, in §9.1.
9.1 Preliminary Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1
By uniform local convergence, we must have that for any 0 < a < b < ∞ (Resnick
1987)
lim
x→∞
sup
a≤t≤b
∣∣∣∣m (xt)m (x) − t−α
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Therefore,
limn→∞E
[∣∣m (Nn)−m (N¯n)∣∣ I{|Nn−N¯n|≤εN¯n}
m
(
N¯n
) ] ≤ limn→∞ sup
1−ε≤t≤1+ε
∣∣∣∣∣m
(
N¯nt
)
m
(
N¯n
) − 1∣∣∣∣∣ ,
≤ O (ε) .
On the other hand, note that
E
[∣∣∣∣∣m (Nn)m (N¯n) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ I{|Nn−N¯n|>εN¯n}
]
≤ E
[∣∣∣∣∣m (Nn)m (N¯n) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ I{Nn−N¯n>εN¯n}
]
+ E
[∣∣∣∣∣m (Nn)m (N¯n) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ I{N¯n−Nn>εN¯n}
]
.
On the event, N¯n (1− ε) > Nn, since m (·) is nondecreasing, we have that∣∣∣∣∣m (Nn)m (N¯n) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1− m (Nn)m (N¯n) ≤ 1,
and therefore
E
[∣∣∣∣∣m (Nn)m (N¯n) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ I{N¯n−Nn>εN¯n}
]
≤ P (∣∣Nn − N¯n∣∣ > εN¯n) = o (1) as n→∞.
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On the other hand, again, because m (·) is nondecreasing,
E
[∣∣∣∣∣m (Nn)m (N¯n) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ I{Nn−N¯n>εN¯n}
]
≤ E
[
m (Nn)
m
(
N¯n
)I{Nn>N¯n(1+ε)}
]
.
Applying Potter’s bound (Bingham, Goldie and Teugels (1987), Theorem 1.5.6 part (iii)) for
each δ > 0, there exists t > 0 such that m (y) /m (x) ≤ 2 (y/x)α+δ if y ≥ x ≥ t. Hence, for
any δ > 0 there exists n0 > 0 such that N¯n ≥ t for all n ≥ n0, and therefore
E
[
m (Nn)
m
(
N¯n
)I{Nn>N¯n(1+ε)}
]
≤ 2E
[(
Nn
N¯n
)α+δ
I{Nn>N¯n(1+ε)}
]
,
≤ 2
(
E
[(
Nn
N¯n
)(α+δ)r])1/r
P
(∣∣Nn − N¯n∣∣ > εN¯n)1/s ,
for any r, s > 1 such that 1/r + 1/s = 1, by Ho¨lder’s inequality. Furthermore, because
α < 1, we can guarantee (α + δ) r < 1 by choosing δ > 0 sufficiently small. Next, Jensen’s
inequality implies that
E
[(
Nn
N¯n
)(α+δ)r]
≤
(
E
[
Nn
N¯n
])(α+δ)r
= 1.
Therefore, we obtain that
E
[
m (Nn)
m
(
N¯n
)I{Nn−N¯n>εN¯n}
]
→ 0 as n→∞,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2
For any arrivals-only policy, Bn (∞) is stochastically bounded by a system where no
matches occur, i.e., agents leave only upon abandonment. In this case, each side of the
market can be modeled as a M/M/∞ queue, which has a Poisson (λn/η) stationary queue
length distribution. Because the total arrival rate of agents is 2λn and two agents exit upon
each match, the maximum long-run rate for matches under any policy is λn. Hence, for any
arrival-only policy we have that Un ≤ λnE [m (Pn)], where Pn is a Poisson (λn/η) random
variable. Because Lemma 1 applies for Pn, it follows that Un ≤ λnm (λn/η).
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Lemma 3 For α = 0, there exists an o(n) sequence zn such that limn→∞
m(zn)
m(n)
= 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
Recall that m(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, 1) and let us define
xn = inf
(
x ∈ (0, 1] : 1− m(xn)
m(n)
≤ x
)
.
We show that xn is o(1). Suppose that this is not true. Then, we have that lim supn xn > 0.
Let ǫ = lim supn xn. By Assumption 2, for all a ∈ (0, 1] and for all ǫ′ > 0 there exists
n0(a, ǫ
′) such that for all n ≥ n0 we have 1− m(an)m(n) ≤ ǫ′. Now, we pick a = ǫ/2 and ǫ′ = ǫ/2.
Then, for each n ≥ n0(ǫ/2, ǫ/2), we have that 1 − m(ǫn/2)m(n) ≤ ǫ/2. Hence, xn ≤ ǫ/2 for each
n ≥ n0(ǫ/2, ǫ/2). This implies lim supn xn ≤ ǫ/2 which is a contradiction.
Let zn = nxn. Because xn is o(1), it follows that zn is o(n). Further, by construction,
limn→∞
m(zn)
m(n)
= 1. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose that {Xn (·)}n≥1 is a sequence of stochastic processes in Rd and define
X∗n (t) = sup0≤s≤t |Xn (s)|. Assume that for each t > 0, the sequence {X∗n (t)}n≥1 is tight.
Moreover, suppose that
Xn (t) = Xn (0) +
∫ t
0
bn (Xn (s)) ds+Mn (t) ,
where {bn (·)}n≥0 is a sequence of continuous functions such that bn (·)→ b (·) uniformly on
compact sets and b (·) is locally Lipschitz, and Mn(·) is a martingale with quadratic variation
[Mn] (·) satisfying
E [[Mn] (t)]→ 0
as n → ∞ for each t > 0. Finally, suppose that Xn (0) → X (0) in probability as n → ∞.
Then Xn (·) → X (·) in probability in the uniform topology on compact sets, where X (·) is
the unique solution to
X (t) = X (0) +
∫ t
0
b (X (s)) ds.
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Proof of Lemma 4
We have that for any c > 0, on the set X∗n (1) ≤ c <∞, the process
Wn (t) =
∫ t
0
bn (Xn (s)) ds
satisfies the following: there exists n0 := n0 (c) < ∞ such that for each n ≥ n0 and for any
0 ≤ s < t ≤ 1, we have
|Wn (t)−Wn (s)| ≤
∫ t
s
‖bn (Xn (r))‖ dr,
≤ sup
0≤r≤1
‖bn (Xn (r))‖ |t− s| ,
≤ (1 + sup
0≤r≤1
‖b (Xn (r))‖)(t− s).
The last inequality follows because bn (·) → b (·) uniformly on compact sets and be-
cause of the tightness of X∗n (1). The Arzela-Ascoli theorem implies that Wn (·) is tight in
the uniform topology. The Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality implies that the martingale
sequence converges to zero uniformly on compact sets and therefore is tight. We conclude
that Xn (·) must be tight in the uniform topology. Consequently, every subsequence contains
a further sub-subsequence converging to the solution to the dynamical system
X (t) = X (0) +
∫ t
0
b (X (s)) ds,
which in turn has a unique solution because b (·) is locally Lipschitz.
9.2 Proof of Theorem 1
For now, let us assume that there exists a real z > 0 such that zn = zn.
We define B¯n (t) = n
−1Bn (t) and S¯n (t) = n−1Sn (t). By (2)-(3) in the main text, we
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can write
B¯n (t) = B¯n (0) +
N+B (nλt)
n
−
N−B
(
η
∫ t
0
Bn (r) dr
)
n
−
∫ t
0
I{B¯n(r−)≥z}dN
+
S (λnr)
n
−
∫ t
0
I{S¯n(r−)≥z}dN
+
B (nλr)
n
, (63)
S¯n (t) = S¯n (0) +
N+S (nλr)
n
−
N−S
(
η
∫ t
0
Sn (r) dr
)
n
−
∫ t
0
I{S¯n(r−)≥z}dN˜
+
B (λnr)
n
−
∫ t
0
I{B¯n(r−)≥z}dN
+
S (λnr)
n
. (64)
We assume that B¯n (0)→ B¯ (0) and S¯n (0)→ S (0). Although formally the process in (63)-
(64) converges to
B¯ (t) = B¯ (0) + λt− η
∫ t
0
B¯ (r) dr − λ
∫ t
0
I{B¯(r)≥z}dr − λ
∫ t
0
I{S¯(r)≥z}dr,
S¯ (t) = S¯ (0) + λt− η
∫ t
0
S¯ (r) dr − λ
∫ t
0
I{B¯(r)≥z}dr − λ
∫ t
0
I{S¯(r)≥z}dr,
this dynamical system is non-standard because the indicator functions are not continuous.
Hence, we need to study this system as the solution to a certain Skorokhod problem. In
particular, we can write
B¯ (t) = B¯ (0) + λt− η
∫ t
0
B¯ (r) dr − LB¯z (t)− LS¯z (t) , (65)
S¯ (t) = S¯ (0) + λt− η
∫ t
0
S¯ (r) dr − LB¯z (t)− LS¯z (t) , (66)
where LB¯z (·) , LS¯z (·) are nondecreasing processes such that LB¯z (0) = LS¯z (0) = 0 and∫ t
0
(
B¯ (r)− z) dLB¯z (r) = ∫ t
0
(
S¯ (r)− z) dLS¯z (r) = 0,
and B¯ (t) , S¯ (t) ≤ z. Hence, LB¯z (·) and LS¯z (·) are minimal nondecreasing processes that
constrain the dynamics of B¯ (·) and S¯ (·) to stay below z.
The existence and uniqueness of the solution to the dynamical system in (65)-(66) is
studied in §9.2.1, which appears at the end of the proof of this theorem. Also, we see that
if z < λ/η, the equilibrium point of (65)-(66) is Y¯ (∞) = (z, z)T .
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Note that
B¯n (t) = B¯n (0) + λt− η
∫ t
0
B¯n (r) dr
−
∫ t
0
I{B¯n(r−)≥z}dN
+
B (λnr)
n
−
∫ t
0
I{S¯n(r−)≥z}N
+
S (λnr)
n
+
N+B (nλt)− nλt
n
+
η
∫ t
0
nB¯n (r) dr −N−B
(
η
∫ t
0
nB¯n (r) dr
)
n
+
∫ t
0
I{B¯n(r−)≥z}dN
+
B (λnr)
n
−
∫ t
0
I{B¯n(r−)≥z}dN
+
S (λnr)
n
+
∫ t
0
I{S¯n(r−)≥z}dN
+
S (λnr)
n
−
∫ t
0
I{S¯n(r−)≥z}dN
+
B (nλr)
n
,
= B¯n (0) + λt− η
∫ t
0
B¯n (r) dr − LB¯nz (t)− LS¯nz (t)
+MBn,1 (t) +M
B
n,2 (t) +M
B
n,3 (t) +M
B
n,4 (t) , (67)
where
MBn,1 (t) =
N+B (nλt)− nλt
n
,
MBn,2 (t) =
η
∫ t
0
nB¯n (r) dr −N−B
(
η
∫ t
0
nB¯n (r) dr
)
n
,
MBn,3 (t) =
∫ t
0
I{B¯n(r−)≥z}dN+B (λnr)
n
−
∫ t
0
I{B¯n(r−)≥z}dN+S (λnr)
n
,
MBn,4 (t) =
∫ t
0
I{S¯n(r−)≥z}dN+S (λnr)
n
−
∫ t
0
I{S¯n(r−)≥z}dN+B (nλr)
n
.
Similarly,
S¯n (t) = S¯n (0) + λt− η
∫ t
0
S¯n (r) dr − LB¯nz (t)− LS¯nz (t)
+MSn,1 (t) +M
S
n,2 (t) +M
S
n,3 (t) +M
S
n,4 (t) . (68)
In (67)-(68), the processes
{
MBn,i
}
n≥1 and
{
MSn,i
}
n≥1 are martingales for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 such
that
E
[
sup
0≤r≤t
∣∣MBn,i (r)∣∣2]+ E [ sup
0≤r≤t
∣∣MSn,i (r)∣∣2] = O (n−1) ,
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which is obtained by upper bounding B¯n (·) by that of a system where no matches occur,
i.e., agents leave only upon abandonment so that either side of the market can be modeled
as an M/M/∞ queue, and then applying Doob’s maximal inequalities. Therefore, we have
that
MBn,i,M
S
n,i → 0
uniformly on compact sets as n→∞ in probability for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
The Lipschitz continuity property of the Skorokhod map, which is established in Section
§9.2.1, implies that
S¯n (·)→ S¯ (·) , B¯n (·)→ B¯ (·)
uniformly on compact sets in probability.
The dynamical system describing
(
B¯, S¯
)
has a unique attractor, which is the point
(z, z) if λ/η ≥ z, given the initial condition B¯ (0) ≤ z, S¯ (0) ≤ z.
To show that the limit interchange (t → ∞ and n → ∞) holds, we begin by upper
bounding with a system with no matching, which implies that the steady-state number of
buyers in the system is less than or equal to a Poisson random variable with rate λn/η. It
follows that E
[
B¯n (∞)
] ≤ λ/η, which in turn implies the uniformity property,
sup
n≥1
E
[
B¯n (∞)
]
<∞. (69)
Next, we have that B¯n (·) → B¯ (·) on compact sets if B¯n (0) → Z as n → ∞. Let us
select B¯n (0) in stationarity (i.e. equal in distribution to B¯n (∞)). Tightness now follows
from (69). Therefore, by choosing a subsequence, we may assume that B¯n (0) → Z (by
Skorokhod embedding, we can assume that this convergence occurs almost surely). By
stationarity, B¯n (1) → B¯ (1) = Z and therefore Z must be a stationary distribution of
the dynamic system B¯ (·). But the stability point is unique and Z = z. Thus, we have
that
(
B¯n (∞) , S¯n (∞)
) → (z, z) almost surely as n → ∞ and we can exchange limits and
expectations.
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Our next goal is to compute the utility rate. Note that if
(
B¯n (0) , S¯n (0)
)
follows the
stationary distribution then taking expectations on both sides of equation (2) of the main
text yields
ηE
(
B¯n (∞)
)
= λ{P (S¯n (∞) < z)− P (B¯n (∞) ≥ z)}. (70)
Observe that
I{S¯n(∞)<z} = I{S¯n(∞)<z,B¯n(∞)≥z} + I{S¯n(∞)<z,B¯n(∞)<z},
= I{B¯n(∞)≥z} + I{B¯n(∞)<z,S¯n(∞)<z}. (71)
Equations (70)-(71) imply that
ηE
(
B¯n (∞)
)
= λP
(
B¯n (∞) < z, S¯n (∞) < z
)
. (72)
Taking the limit in (72) as n→∞, we conclude that
ηz
λ
= lim
n→∞
P
(
B¯n (∞) < z, S¯n (∞) < z
)
. (73)
Equation (71) also implies that
I{B¯n(∞)≥z} + I{S¯n(∞)≥z} = 1− I{B¯n(∞)<z,S¯n(∞)<z}. (74)
By symmetry, we conclude from (73)-(74) that
lim
n→∞
P
(
B¯n (∞) ≥ z
)
=
1
2
(
1− ηz
λ
)
. (75)
Equation (75) allows us to compute the utility rate:
Upn(zn) = 2λnE
[
m (Bn (∞)) I{Bn(∞)≥zn}
]
,
= 2λnE [m (Bn (∞)) |Bn (∞) ≥ zn]P (Bn (∞) ≥ zn) ,
= λnm (zn)
(
1− ηz
λ
)
(1 + o (1)) (76)
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as n → ∞, where the last equality follows from the use of Lemma 1 and the observation
that
P (|Bn (∞)− zn| ≥ εn|Bn (∞) ≥ zn)→ 0 as n→∞.
Thus, by equation (1) in the main text and (76),
Upn(zn)
nm(n)
= λzα
(
1− ηz
λ
)
(1 + o (1)) . (77)
We first consider the case where α > 0. Then (77) implies that among all policies such
that zn = Ω(n), setting zn = z∗n is asymptotically optimal. Further, for zn = o (n), using
the same technique based on the fluid analysis, one can show that U
p
n(zn)
nm(n)
= o(t); details are
omitted for brevity. This completes the proof for α > 0.
Finally, we consider the case where α = 0. To make the dependence of Bn(∞) on zn
more explicit, for the rest of the proof we denote Bn(∞) as B(zn)n (∞). Using the fluid limit
analysis similar to above, for any sequence of thresholds zn that is o (n), we can show that
E[B
(zn)
n (∞)] is o(n), as follows. In the pre-limit, in particular in equations (63)-(64) and (67)-
(68), we replace z with zn/n, and then using essentially the same arguments as above we
obtain the fluid limit where
(
B¯
(zn)
n (∞) , S¯(zn)n (∞)
)
→ (0, 0) almost surely. Further, by using
the same arguments as those used to obtain (75), we can show that
lim
n→∞
P
(
B(zn)n (∞) ≥ zn
)
=
1
2
. (78)
By symmetry, we also have
lim
n→∞
P
(
S(zn)n (∞) ≥ zn
)
=
1
2
. (79)
Now consider the nth system, i.e., the system with the arrival rate of buyers equal to
λn. For k = 1, 2, . . . , define I
(n)
k as follows: I
(n)
k is equal to 1 if the k
th arrival of buyers sees
at least zn sellers upon arrival and is equal to 0 otherwise. Then PASTA (Poisson Arrivals
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See Time Averages) implies that
lim
k→∞
1
k
k∑
j=1
I
(n)
j =
1
2
+ o(1).
For each k = 1, 2, . . . , and for each n = 1, 2, . . ., let R
(n)
k be an independent random variable
with distribution Fzn . Then, again by PASTA, we have
lim
k→∞
1
k
k∑
j=1
I
(n)
j R
(n)
j = m(zn)
(
1
2
+ o(1)
)
.
However, by Assumption 1 and by symmetry, with probability 1 we have
Upn(zn) ≥ 2λn lim
k→∞
1
k
k∑
j=1
I
(n)
j R
(n)
j . (80)
Thus, we have Upn(zn) ≥ λnm(zn) (1 + o(1)) . Consequently, for any sequence zn = o(n) such
that
lim
n→∞
m(zn)
m(n)
= 1,
we would have that Upn(zn) ≥ λnm(n) (1 + o(1)). Lemma 3 guarantees that such a sequence
exists.
Combining these results with the upper bound in Lemma 2 completes the proof for
α = 0, and thus also the overall proof of Theorem 1.
9.2.1 Skorokhod Problem
In this subsection, we consider the existence and uniqueness of the system of differential
equations
B¯ (t) = B¯ (0)− η
∫ t
0
(
B¯ (r)− λ
η
)
dr − LB¯z (t)− LS¯z (t) ,
S¯ (t) = S¯ (0)− η
∫ t
0
(
S¯ (r)− λ
η
)
dr − LB¯z (t)− LS¯z (t) ,
where LB¯z (·) , LS¯z (·) are nondecreasing processes such that LB¯z (0) = LS¯z (0) = 0,∫ t
0
(
B¯ (r)− z) dLB¯z (r) = ∫ t
0
(
S¯ (r)− z) dLS¯z (r) = 0,
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and B¯ (t) , S¯ (t) ≤ z. Hence, LB¯z (·) and LS¯z (·) are minimal nondecreasing processes that
constrain the dynamics of B¯ (·) and S¯ (·) to stay below z.
In order to use explicit expressions for Skorokhod problems studied in the positive
orthant, we introduce a change of coordinates. Defining B¯z (t) = z− B¯ (t), S¯z (t) = z− S¯ (t)
and λ¯z = λ/η − z ≥ 0, we have that
B¯z (t) = B¯z (0)− η
∫ t
0
(
B¯z (r) + λ¯z
)
dr + L (t) ≥ 0,
S¯z (t) = S¯z (0)− η
∫ t
0
(
S¯z (r) + λ¯z
)
dr + L (t) ≥ 0,
where ∫ t
0
min
(
B¯z (r) , S¯z (r)
)
dL (r) = 0, L (0) = 0.
Further, if we define
Z(t) = min
(
B¯z (0)− η
∫ t
0
(
B¯z (r) + λ¯z
)
dr, S¯z (0)− η
∫ t
0
(
S¯z (r) + λ¯z
)
dr
)
,
then
Y (t) := min
(
B¯z (t) , S¯z (t)
)
= Z (t) + L (t) ,
which implies that
Y (t) = Z (t) + max
0≤s≤t
{−Z (s) , 0} ,
L (t) = max
0≤s≤t
{
−B¯z (0) + η
∫ s
0
(
B¯z (r) + λ¯z
)
dr,−S¯z (0) + η
∫ s
0
(
S¯z (r) + λ¯z
)
dr, 0
}
.
We then obtain L
(
t; B¯z, S¯z
)
:= L (t), to emphasize the dependence on
(
B¯z, S¯z
)
, yielding
B¯z (t) = B¯z (0) + η
∫ t
0
(
B¯z (r) + λ¯z
)
dr + L
(
t; B¯z, S¯z
)
, (81)
S¯z (t) = S¯z (0) + η
∫ t
0
(
S¯z (r) + λ¯z
)
dr + L
(
t; B¯z, S¯z
)
. (82)
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We need to show that (81)-(82) has a unique solution. We first argue uniqueness. Assume
that there exists another solution that we shall denote as
(
B¯′z, S¯
′
z
)
and consider ∆B = B¯z−B¯′z
and ∆S = S¯z − S¯ ′z. Suppose that ∆S (0) = ∆B (0) = 0. Then
∆B (t) = η
∫ t
0
∆B (r) dr + L
(
t; B¯z, S¯z
)− L (t; B¯′z, S¯ ′z) ,
∆S (t) = η
∫ t
0
∆S (r) dr + L
(
t; B¯z, S¯z
)− L (t; B¯′z, S¯ ′z) .
Now, consider any real numbers a, b, c, a′, b′, c′. Suppose without loss of generality that
a = max (a, b, c) ≥ max (a′, b′, c′). Then, since max (a′, b′, c′) ≥ a′, we conclude that
0 ≤ a−max (a′, b′, c′) ≤ a− a′,
which implies
|max (a, b, c)−max (a′, b′, c′)| ≤ |a− a′|+ |b− b′|+ |c− c′| .
Consequently, if D (t) = |∆B (t)|+ |∆S (t)|, we conclude
D (t) ≤ 2η
∫ t
0
D (r) dr.
Because D (t) = 0, a direct application of Gronwall’s inequality yields that D (t) = 0 for all
t > 0, and uniqueness follows.
Now we argue the existence of a solution to (81)-(82). The construction follows by
applying a standard Pickard iteration. Let
Bt (B, S) = B (0) + η
∫ t
0
(
B (r) + λ¯z
)
dr + L (t;B, S) ,
St (B, S) = S (0) + η
∫ t
0
(
S (r) + λ¯z
)
dr + L (t;B, S) .
Observe that the map (B, S)→ (B,S) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to the uniform
topology over any compact time interval [0, T ], using the corresponding uniform metric
‖(B, S)‖[0,T ] = sup
0≤t≤T
(|B (t)|+ |S (t)|) .
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Define B
(0)
z (t) = B
(0)
z (0) , S
(0)
z (t) = S
(0)
z (0), and iteratively, for m ≥ 1,
B(m)z (t) = Bt(B
(m−1)
z , S
(m−1)
z ); S
(m)
z (t) = St(B
(m−1)
z , S
(m−1)
z ).
Noting that B
(m)
z (0) = B
(m−1)
z (0) and S
(m)
z (0) = S
(m−1)
z (0), we have
|B(m)z (t)−B(m−1)z (t) |+ |S(m)z (t)− S(m−1)z (t) |
≤ 3η
∫ t
0
|B(m−1)z (r)− B(m−2)z (r) |+ |S(m−1)z (r)− S(m−2)z (r) |dr.
Consequently, using ‖·‖[0,T ] to denote the uniform norm over the interval [0, T ], we conclude
that
∥∥(B(m)z , S(m)z )− (B(m−1)z , S(m−1)z )∥∥[0,T ] ≤ 3ηT ∥∥(B(m−1)z , S(m−1)z )− (B(m−2)z , S(m−2)z )∥∥[0,T ] .
Choosing 0 < T < 1/(3η) we can deduce – by applying successive iterations and the triangle
inequality – that {(B(m)z , S(m)z ) : m ≥ 1} forms a Cauchy sequence in the space of continuous
functions endowed with the uniform topology, which is a complete separable metric space.
Therefore, by continuity of the map (B, S) → (B,S), the limiting sequence must satisfy
(81). The construction can be applied sequentially to consecutive intervals of size less than
1/(3η).
9.3 Proof of Theorem 2
For now, we assume that the thresholds satisfy
vn
m(n)
→ v for some v ≥ 0.
We consider a Poisson-flow representation of the scaled utility-based dynamics, whose va-
lidity is demonstrated in §9.3.1. In particular, it suffices to study the scaled processes
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B¯n (t) = n
−1Bn (t) and S¯n (t) = n−1Sn (t), which give rise to the representation
B¯n (t) = B¯n (0) +
N+B
(
λn
∫ t
0
FSn(r) (vn) dr
)
n
−
N−B
(
η
∫ t
0
Bn (r) dr
)
n
−
N˜+S
(
λn
∫ t
0
(
1− FBn(r) (vn)
)
dr
)
n
, (83)
S¯n (t) = S¯n (0) +
N+S
(
λn
∫ t
0
FBn(r) (vn) dr
)
n
−
N−S
(
η
∫ t
0
Sn (r) dr
)
n
−
N˜+B
(
λn
∫ t
0
(
1− FSn(r) (vn)
)
dr
)
n
, (84)
where N+B (·) , N˜+B (·) , N−B (·) , N+S (·) , N˜+S (·) , N−S (·) are independent Poisson processes with
unit mean.
Note that under Assumption 3, we have
Fnx (m (n) z) = P (M (nx) ≤ m (n) z) ,
= P (Zm (nx) ≤ m (n) z) (1 + o (1)) ,
= e−κx/z
1/α
(1 + o (1)) .
Using this result, the putative fluid limit of (83)-(84) is given by
B¯ (t) = B¯ (0) + λ
∫ t
0
e−κS¯(r)/v
1/α − η
∫ t
0
B¯ (r) dr − λ
∫ t
0
(
1− e−κB¯(r)/v1/α
)
dr,
S¯ (t) = S¯ (0) + λ
∫ t
0
e−κB¯(r)/v
1/α − η
∫ t
0
S¯ (r) dr − λ
∫ t
0
(
1− e−κS¯(r)/v1/α
)
dr.
We proceed in four steps. The first step is to obtain a martingale decomposition similar
to that given in the proof of Theorem 1 part ii. The martingales will converge to zero on
compact sets. The second step is to show that
{(
B¯n(·), S¯n(·)
)}
n≥1 is tight in the Skorokhod
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topology using the technique developed in Ethier and Kurtz (2005). The third step is to
show that the putative fluid limit has a unique solution. The fourth step is to show that
the ordinary differential equation (ODE) describing the fluid limit has a unique stationary
point.
Together, these four steps imply that any subsequence of the sequence
{(
B¯n(·), S¯n(·)
)}
n≥1
will contain a subsequence that converges (by tightness) to the unique solution of the above
ODE, and therefore the fluid limit convergence holds. Further, since supnE[B¯n(∞)] < ∞
follows easily from the upper bound where no matching happens, we have that any subse-
quence of
{
(B¯n(∞), S¯n(∞))
}
n≥1 will contain a subsequence that converges.
Now, consider the stationary versions of the process (Bn(.), Sn(.)). By stationarity, we
have that if any subsequence of
{
(B¯n(∞), S¯n(∞))
}
n≥1 converges then it has to converge to
(z¯, z¯), which is the unique stationary point of the dynamical system describing (B¯(t), S¯(t)).
Thus,
{
(B¯n(∞), S¯n(∞))
}
n≥1 converges to (z¯, z¯).
Step 1: Consider the martingales
MBn,1(t) =
N+B
(
λn
∫ t
0
FSn(r) (vn) dr
)
n
− λ
∫ t
0
FSn(r) (vn) dr,
MBn,2(t) =
N−B
(
η
∫ t
0
Bn (r) dr
)
n
− η
∫ t
0
B¯n (r) dr,
MBn,3(t) =
N˜+S
(
λn
∫ t
0
(
1− FBn(r) (vn)
)
dr
)
n
− λ
∫ t
0
(
1− FBn(r) (vn)
)
dr,
so that (83) can be expressed as
B¯n(t) = B¯n(0) + λ
∫ t
0
FSn(r) (vn)− η
∫ t
0
B¯n (r) dr − λ
∫ t
0
(
1− FBn(r) (vn)
)
dr
+MBn,1(t)−MBn,2(t)−MBn,3(t).
As argued in the proof of Theorem 1 part ii, using the upper bound on Bn(t) vis-a-vis
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no matching and Doob’s maximal inequality, we get
E
[
sup
0≤r≤t
|Mn,i (r)|2
]
= O
(
n−1
)
.
Thus, for i = 1, 2, 3, MBn,i → 0 as n→∞ uniformly on compact sets.
Further, because FSn(r) lies in [0, 1] w.p. 1, from Assumption 3 the process
∫ t
0
FSn(r) (vn) dr−∫ t
0
exp
(−κS¯n (r) /v1/α) dr converges to 0 uniformly over compact sets. Similarly,∫ t
0
(
1− FBn(r) (vn)
)
dr −
∫ t
0
(
1− e−κB¯n(r)/v1/α
)
dr
converges to 0 uniformly over compact sets.
Analogously define martingales MSn,i for i = 1, 2, 3 for S¯n. Again, for i = 1, 2, 3,
MSn,i → 0 as n→∞ uniformly on compact sets.
Because FSn(r) lies in [0, 1] w.p.1, the quadratic variations [Mn,1(t)] and [Mn,3(t)] are
bounded from above by the quadratic variation of n−1N+B (λnt), which tends to 0 as n→∞.
We now show that [Mn,2(t)] also tends to 0 as n → ∞ for a given t. Note that Bn(.) is
bounded from above by the process corresponding to no matching, which has O(n) mean.
Thus, the mean number of jumps in n−1N−B
(
η
∫ t
0
Bn (r) dr
)
is O(n). Further, the size of
each jump is 1/n with probability 1. Hence, the quadratic variation [Mn,2(t)]→ 0 as n→∞.
Similarly, the quadratic variations of MSn,i(t) for i = 1, 2, 3 also tend to 0 as n→∞.
Thus, from Lemma 4 in §9.1 we have that
B¯n (·)→ B¯ (·) and S¯n (·)→ S¯ (·)
uniformly on compact sets in probability.
Step 2: Using Theorem 7.2 of Chapter 3 in Ethier and Kurtz (2005), we show that
the family
{(
(B¯n(t) : t ≥ 0), (S¯n(t) : t ≥ 0)
)}
n≥1 is tight in the Skorokhod topology. The
first condition of Theorem 7.2 of Ethier and Kurtz (2005) holds easily since for each t we
have that B¯n(t) and S¯n(t) are both stochastically bounded from above by 1/n times Poisson
distributed random variables with mean λnt, each of which concentrates as n→∞.
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We now show that the second condition of Theorem 7.2 of Chapter 3 in Ethier and
Kurtz (2005) holds as well. Note that, for each n, the times of positive jumps in Bn are a
subset of jump times in a Poisson process of rate λn. Also, the departures from Bn may
occur either when a customer in Bn abandons or when a customer arrives in Sn. Further,
the times of customer abandonment is a subset of departure times in a M/M/∞ queue,
which – due to the time-reversibility of the M/M/∞ queue – form a Poisson process with
rate λn (plus a finite number of departures due to finite initial conditions). Thus, the times
of negative jumps in Bn are a subset of jump times in a Poisson process of rate λn. Also,
w.p.1, each jump is of size 1.
Thus, the modulus of continuity (see page 122 of Ethier and Kurtz 2005) of B¯n is
less than that of n−1ABn where A
B
n is a Poisson process of rate 3λn. Similarly, the modulus
of continuity of S¯n is less than that of n
−1ASn where A
S
n is a Poisson process of rate 3λn.
Therefore, it is enough to verify the second condition of Theorem 7.2 of Chapter 3 in Ethier
and Kurtz (2005) for
{(
(n−1A¯Bn (t) : t ≥ 0), (n−1A¯Sn(t) : t ≥ 0)
)}
n≥1, which is easy to do.
Step 3: Recall that B¯n (0)→ B¯ (0) and S¯n (0)→ S (0). Because the dynamical system
describing B¯ (t) and S¯ (t) is an ODE with Lipschitz coefficients, it has a unique solution.
Step 4: Using the fluid limit characterization, the fundamental theorem of calculus,
and symmetry, for each stationary solution to the ODE we have
0 = λe−κz¯/v
1/α − ηz¯ − λ(1− e−κz¯/v1/α),
= −ηz¯ − λ+ 2λe−κz¯/v1/α . (85)
Solving (85) for v, we define for z¯ ∈ (0, λ/η),
v (z¯) =
 κz¯
ln
(
2λ
ηz¯+λ
)
α . (86)
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We can also uniquely solve for z¯ (v) for v ∈ (0,∞) by finding the inverse of (86), which yields
z¯ (v) = −λ
η
+
v1/α
κ
W
(
2λκ
ηv1/α
exp
(
λκ
ηv1/α
))
, (87)
where W (x) is the Lambert W function. Although we can work with either v ∈ (0,∞)
or z¯ ∈ (0, λ/η) when optimizing the asymptotic utility rate, it will be more convenient to
optimize in terms of z¯ and then find the optimal utility threshold using (86), as we now
explain.
For each v ≥ 0, we have established that {(B¯n(∞), S¯n(∞))}n≥1 converges to a unique
(z¯, z¯), which can be characterized as above. Observe that z¯(v) → λ/η as v → ∞. Also,
again using (85), we have that z¯(v) → 0 as v → 0, which is same as the limit under the
greedy policy. Thus, if vn is o(n) then B¯n(∞) is also o(n).
Assumption 3 implies that
E
[
E[M (Bn (∞)) I{M(Bn(∞))≥vn}|Bn (∞)]
]
∼ E [E[m (Bn (∞))ZI{m(Bn(∞))Z≥vn}|Bn (∞)]] ,
∼ m (nz¯(v))E [ZI{m(nz¯(v))Z≥vn}] ,
∼ m (nz¯(v))E [ZI{z¯(v)αZ≥v}] .
Thus, by (8) in the main text, the utility rate satisfies
Uun (vn) = 2λnE
[
E[M (Bn (∞)) I{M(Bn(∞))≥vn}|Bn (∞)]
]
,
= 2λnm (nz¯(v))E
[
ZI{Z≥ vz¯(v)α}
]
(1 + o (1)) .
Assumption 2 implies that Uun (vn)/m(n) is o(n) if vn = o(n), and is Θ(n) if vn is Θ(n).
Furthermore, E
[
ZI{Z≥v/z¯(v)α}
] → 0 if v → ∞. Thus, Uun (vn)/m(n) is o(n) if vn = ω(n).
Consequently, the optimal policy can be computed either as
sup
v∈(0,∞)
2λz¯ (v)αE
[
ZI{Z≥ vz¯(v)α}
]
,
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or, in terms of z¯, as
sup
z¯∈(0,λ/η)
2λz¯αE
[
ZI{Z≥ v(z¯)z¯α }
]
, (88)
and we will solve (88).
Note that by Assumption 3, Z = (κ−1T )−α, where T is an exponential random variable
with mean one. It follows that
E
[
ZI{Z≥ v(z¯)z¯α }
]
= E
[(
κ−1T
)−α
I{
γz¯
v(z¯)1/α
≥T
}
]
, (89)
= κα
∫ κz¯/v(z¯)1/α
0
t−αe−tdt, (90)
where by (86) the upper integration limit in (90) is
κz¯
v (z¯)1/α
= ln
(
2λ
ηz¯ + λ
)
. (91)
Note that the objective function of (88) is zero at z¯ = 0 and at z¯ = λ/η (taking the
limits from the left and right, respectively). Therefore, since the right side of (88) is positive
for z¯ ∈ (0, λ/η), any global maximizer in (88) must be a stationary point. This, in turn,
implies that any global maximizer must satisfy
0 =
d
dz¯
z¯α
∫ κz¯/v(z¯)1/α
0
t−αe−tdt,
= z¯α
d
dz¯
∫ κz¯/v(z¯)1/α
0
t−αe−tdt+ αz¯α−1
∫ κz¯/v(z¯)1/α
0
t−αe−tdt.
Equation (91) implies that
d
dz¯
κz¯
v (z¯)1/α
=
d
dz¯
ln
(
2λ
ηz¯ + λ
)
= − η
(ηz¯ + λ)
. (92)
Therefore,
d
dz¯
∫ κz¯/v(z¯)1/α
0
t−αe−tdt =
(
κz¯
v (z¯)1/α
)−α
exp
(
ln
(
ηz¯ + λ
2λ
))
d
dz¯
κz¯
v (z¯)1/α
,
= − v(z¯)η
2λ(κz¯)α
,
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which implies that
αz¯−1
∫ κz¯/v(z¯)1/α
0
t−αe−tdt =
d
dz¯
∫ κz¯/v(z¯)1/α
0
t−αe−tdt,
=
v(z¯)η
2λ(κz¯)α
,
or equivalently,
v (z¯) η
2λκα
= αz¯α−1
∫ κz¯/v(z¯)1/α
0
t−αe−tdt. (93)
Because α ∈ (0, 1), the right side of (93) is decreasing and continuous in (0, λ/η), whereas
by (92) the left side of (93) is increasing in the same range. Moreover, the left side of (93)
vanishes at zero and the right side vanishes at λ/η. We conclude that there a unique solution
z∗ to (93). Finally, the optimal policy is given by v (z∗) in (86) and the conclusion of the
theorem follows directly by substituting in the expresson for z∗ into (88).
9.3.1 Markov Dynamics of Utility-Based Process
In this subsection, we show that the actual dynamics of the utility threshold policy are
equivalent to the Poisson-flow representation given by
Bn (t) = Bn (0) +N
+
B
(
λn
∫ t
0
FSn(r) (vn) dr
)
−N−B
(
η
∫ t
0
Bn (r) dr
)
−N˜+S
(
λn
∫ t
0
(
1− FBn(r) (vn)
)
dr
)
, (94)
Sn (t) = Sn (0) +N
+
S
(
λn
∫ t
0
FBn(r) (vn) dr
)
−N−S
(
η
∫ t
0
Sn (r) dr
)
−N˜+B
(
λn
∫ t
0
(
1− FSn(r) (vn)
)
dr
)
, (95)
where N+B , N˜
+
B , N
+
S , N˜
+
S , N
−
B , N
−
S are all independent Poisson processes with unit mean. For
simplicity, we shall let n = 1 and λ = η = 1.
Recall that the actual dynamics under the utility threshold policy are governed by the
61
equations
B˜ (t) = B˜ (0) +
N+B (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
S˜(ABj−)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
} −
N+S (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
B˜(AS
j−
)
i=1 V
S
i,j>v
} (96)
−N−B
(∫ t
0
B˜ (r−) dr
)
,
S˜ (t) = S˜ (0) +
N+S (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
B˜(AS
j−
)
i=1 V
S
i,j≤v
} −
N+B (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
S˜(AS
j−
)
i=1 V
B
i,j>v
}
−N−S
(∫ t
0
S˜ (r) dr
)
, (97)
where
{
V Bi,j : i ≥ 1, j ≥ 1
}
and
{
V Si,j : i ≥ 1, j ≥ 1
}
form two independent arrays of i.i.d. ran-
dom variables with CDF F (·). In addition, {ABj : j ≥ 1} is the sequence of arrival times
associated with N+B and
{
ASj : j ≥ 1
}
is the sequence of arrival times associated with N+S .
Because of the mutual independence among the V Bi,js, the V
S
i,js and all of the unit rate Pois-
son processes, N+B , N
+
S , N
−
B , N
−
S , it follows that the process
(
B˜, S˜
)
is Markovian and is
non-explosive because each of its coordinates (i.e. B˜ and S˜, respectively) can be bounded
by independent infinite server queues, simply by setting v =∞. Consequently, this Markov
process is well defined.
We have introduced a slight inconsistency in the notation in this subsection only, since
we are now using (B˜, S˜) to denote the actual dynamics. Ultimately, this is not important
because, as our analysis in this subsection demonstrates, these are equivalent representations.
The strategy consists of showing that the generators (or rate matrices) of the processes
coincide.
Let f : ZN × ZN → R be any bounded function and note that (by standard properties
of the Poisson process),
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E [f (B (h) , S (h))− f (B (0) , S (0)) |B (0) , S (0)]
= E
[∫ h
0
[f (B (t−) + 1, S (t−))− f (B (t−) , S (t−))] dN+B
(∫ t
0
FS(r) (v) dr
)
|B (0) , S (0)
]
+ E
[∫ h
0
[f (B (t−)− 1, S (t−))− f (B (t−) , S (t−))] dN−B
(∫ t
0
B (r) dr
)
|B (0) , S (0)
]
+ E
[∫ h
0
[f (B (t−)− 1, S (t−))− f (B (t−) , S (t−))] dN˜+S
(∫ t
0
(
1− FB(r) (v)
)
dr
)
|B (0) , S (0)
]
+ E
[∫ h
0
[f (B (t−) , S (t−) + 1)− f (B (t−) , S (t−))] dN+S
(∫ t
0
FB(r) (v) dr
)
|B (0) , S (0)
]
+ E
[∫ h
0
[f (B (t−) , S (t−)− 1)− f (B (t−) , S (t−))] dN−S
(∫ t
0
S (r) dr
)
|B (0) , S (0)
]
+ E
[∫ h
0
[f (B (t−) , S (t−)− 1)− f (B (t−) , S (t−))] dN˜+B
(∫ t
0
(
1− FS(r) (v)
)
dr
)
|B (0) , S (0)
]
+ o (h) as h→ 0. (98)
Since
M0 (t) = N
+
B
(∫ t
0
FS(r) (v) dr
)
−
∫ t
0
FS(r) (v) dr, (99)
is a martingale, we have that
E
[∫ h
0
[f (B (t−) + 1, S (t−))− f (B (t−) , S (t−))] dN+B
(∫ t
0
FS(r) (v) dr
)
|B (0) , S(0)
]
= E
[∫ h
0
[f (B (t−) + 1, S (t−))− f (B (t−) , S (t−))]FS(t) (v) dt|B (0) , S(0)
]
,
= [f (B (0) + 1, S (0))− f (B (0) , S (0))]FS(0) (v)h+ o (h) as h→ 0.
Similarly, we can evaluate each of the expectations appearing in the right side of (98); e.g.,
the second and third expectations are
E
[∫ h
0
[f (B (t−)− 1, S (t−))− f (B (t−) , S (t−))] dN−B
(∫ t
0
B (r) dr
)
|B (0) , S(0)
]
(100)
+ E
[∫ h
0
[f (B (t−)− 1, S (t−))− f (B (t−) , S (t−))] dN˜+S
(∫ t
0
(
1− FB(r) (v)
)
dr
)
|B (0) , S(0)
]
= [f (B (0)− 1, S (0))− f (B (0) , S (0))] [B (0) + (1− FB(0) (v))]h+ o (h) as h→ 0.
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The above calculations show that the key to verifying that two well-defined Markov
jump processes with unit-size jumps are identical in law (i.e., have the same generator) is
showing that the corresponding compensators of the associated point processes agree (i.e.,
they depend on the associated processes in the same way). The corresponding martingales
that identify the compensators are, in addition to M0 in (99),
M1 (t) = N
−
B
(∫ t
0
B (r) dr
)
−
∫ t
0
B (r) dr,
M2 (t) = N˜
+
S
(∫ t
0
(
1− FB(r) (v)
)
dr
)
−
∫ t
0
(
1− FB(r) (v)
)
dr,
M3 (t) = N
+
S
(∫ t
0
FB(r) (v) dr
)
−
∫ t
0
FB(r) (v) dr,
M4 (t) = N
−
S
(∫ t
0
S (r) dr
)
−
∫ t
0
S (r) dr,
M5 (t) = N˜
+
B
(∫ t
0
(
1− FS(r) (v)
)
dr
)
−
∫ t
0
(
1− FS(r) (v)
)
dr.
To identify the corresponding compensators of the actual dynamics of the utility thresh-
old policy, we express these dynamics by means of a point process representation and then
compute the corresponding compensators with respect to the σ-field generated by the pop-
ulation processes (buyers and sellers).
We need to study the compensator of the point processes
N+B (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
S˜(ABj−)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
}, (101)
N+S (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
B˜(AS
j−
)
i=1 V
S
i,j>v
}, (102)
N+S (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
B˜(AS
j
−)
i=1 V
S
i,j≤v
}, (103)
N+B (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
S˜(AB
j
−)
i=1 V
B
i,j>v
}, (104)
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with respect to the filtration generated by the processes B˜ (·) and S˜ (·), which we shall denote
as G = {Gt : t ≥ 0}. We claim that for any t, r > 0, the conditional expectation of (101) can
be expressed as
E
 N+B (t+r)∑
j=N+B (t)+1
I{
max
S˜(ABj −)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
}|Gt
 = E [∫ t+r
t
FS˜(u) (v) du|Gt
]
.
By Fubini’s theorem, because every term is nonnegative in the second equality in the follow-
ing display, we have that
E
 N+B (t+r)∑
j=N+B (t)+1
I{
max
S˜(ABj −)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
}|Gt
 = E
 ∞∑
j=1
I{t<ABj ≤t+r}I{
max
S˜(ABj −)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
}|Gt
 ,
=
∞∑
j=1
E
I{t<ABj ≤t+r}I{
max
S˜(ABj −)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
}|Gt
 .
Note that for each j ≥ 1, ABj is a stopping time, and therefore, by the tower property
in the second equality,
E
I{t<ABj ≤t+r}I{
max
S˜(ABj −)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
}|Gt

=
∫ t+r
t
E
[
I{
max
S˜(u−)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
}|Gt, ABj = u
]
P
(
ABj ∈ du|Gt
)
,
=
∫ t+r
t
E
[
E
[
I{
max
S˜(u−)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
}|Gu−, ABj = u
]
|Gt, ABj = u
]
P
(
ABj ∈ du|Gt
)
,
=
∫ t+r
t
E
[
FS˜(u−) (v) |Gt, ABj = u
]
P
(
ABj ∈ du|Gt
)
,
= E
[
I{t<ABj ≤t+r}FS˜(ABj−) (v) |Gt
]
.
Applying Fubini’s theorem again and summing over j, we conclude that
E
 N+B (t+r)∑
j=N+B (t)+1
I{
max
S˜(ABj −)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
}|Gt
 = E [∫ t+r
t
FS˜(u−) (v) dN
+
B (u) |Gt
]
.
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However, we have that the compensator of N+B (·) is the identity and therefore
E
 N+B (t+r)∑
j=N+B (t)+1
I{
max
S˜(ABj −)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
}|Gt
 = E [∫ t+r
t
FS˜(u−) (v) du|Gt
]
.
We conclude that
M˜0 (t) =
N+B (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
S˜(ABj−)
i=1 V
B
i,j≤v
} −
∫ t
0
FS˜(u) (v) du
is a martingale and it proves the corresponding compensator with respect to G. A completely
analogous development can be obtained for the point processes in (102)-(104), resulting in
the martingales
M˜1 (t) = N
−
B
(∫ t
0
B˜ (r) dr
)
−
∫ t
0
B˜ (r) dr,
M˜2 (t) =
N+S (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
B˜(AS
j−
)
i=1 V
S
i,j>v
} −
∫ t
0
(
1− FB˜(r) (v)
)
dr,
M˜3 (t) =
N+S (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
B˜(AS
j−
)
i=1 V
S
i,j≤v
} −
∫ t
0
FB˜(r) (v) dr,
M˜4 (t) = N
−
S
(∫ t
0
S˜ (r) dr
)
−
∫ t
0
S˜ (r) dr,
M˜5 (t) =
N+B (t)∑
j=1
I{
max
S˜(AB
j−
)
i=1 V
B
i,j>v
} −
∫ t
0
(
1− FS˜(r) (v)
)
dr.
This implies, by the reasoning given right after (100) and comparing M˜i vs Mi for i ∈
{0, 1, ..., 5}, that (94)-(95) and (96)-(97) are equivalent.
10 Extreme Value Theory and Regularly Varying Func-
tions
In this section, we collect some useful facts about extreme value theory and show that
Assumption 2 is satisfied by distributions that are subject to the application of extreme
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value theory. Throughout this section we assume that the Vis are i.i.d. random variables.
The central result in extreme value theory is that, for certain distributions F (v), the
CDF of a properly normalized version of M (n) converges to a limiting CDF that is known
as the generalized Pareto distribution. More precisely,
P
(
M (n)− bn
an
≤ x
)
→ Ξ(ax+ b; ξ) as n→∞, (105)
where
Ξ(x; ξ) := exp
(
− (1 + ξx)−1/ξ
)
, 1 + ξx > 0
and ξ ∈ R. The case ξ = 0 is interpreted as G(x; 0) = e−e−x .
There are three domains of attraction: ξ < 0 (Weibull), ξ = 0 (the Gumbel), and
ξ > 0 (the Frechet). Distributions with bounded support (e.g., uniform, beta) typically
belong to the Weibull domain of attraction. Distributions with finite moments of every
order (often, but not always, with unbounded support) belong to the domain of attraction
of the Gumbel distribution (e.g., exponential, gamma, normal, lognormal). Distributions
with power-law-like decaying tails belong to the domain of attraction of the Frechet distri-
bution (e.g., Pareto, Cauchy). The CDFs corresponding to the Weibull, Gumbel and Frechet
domains of attraction are readily available by evaluating the corresponding values of ξ in
G(x; ξ).
Define F¯ (x) = 1− F (x) and let w(F ) = sup{x : F (x) < 1} be the upper endpoint of
the support of F . If convergence to a generalized Pareto distribution with parameter ξ holds
(i.e. if extreme value theory applies), then the corresponding constants can be computed as
follows:
Weibull(ξ < 0) : an = w(F )− F¯−1(n−1), bn = w(F ), a = −1/ξ, and b = 1/ξ, (106)
Gumbel(ξ = 0) : an =
1
F¯ (bn)
∫ w(F )
bn
F¯ (t) dt, bn = F¯
−1(n−1), a = 0, and b = 0, (107)
Frechet(ξ > 0) : an = F¯
−1(n−1), bn = 0, a = 1/ξ, and b = −1/ξ, (108)
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where F¯−1(·) is the inverse of F¯ (·).
We now switch our attention to E[M (n)]. Theorem 2.1 in Pickands (1968) shows that
the first moment converges as long as E[V 1+δ] <∞ for some δ > 0, which is satisfied for all
the concrete examples explored in this paper. This result implies that
E[M (n)] ∼ bn + anµ , (109)
where
µ =
∫ ∞
−∞
x dΞ(ax+ b; ξ) for ξ ∈ (−∞,∞) (110)
is the mean of the distribution Ξ(·; ξ) computed according to the limiting value of the domain
of attraction. The symbol xn ∼ yn is shorthand for xnyn → 1 as n→∞. The mean in (110) is
µ = γ = 0.5772 . . . if ξ = 0, which is Euler’s constant; µ = Γ(1−ξ), where Γ(a) is the gamma
function evaluated at a > 0, if ξ ∈ (0, 1), which holds in the Frechet case if E(V 1+δ) < ∞;
and µ = −Γ(1− ξ) if ξ < 0.
We conclude this section by stating the relationship between extreme value theory
and slowly varying functions, thereby showing that the extreme value distributions satisfy
Assumption 2.
Fact 1. If F belongs to the domain of attraction of the Gumbel distribution (i.e.
ξ = 0) then bn is slowly varying at infinity.
Fact 1 follows from Proposition 0.10 of Resnick (1987), combined with the first exercise
on p. 35 of Resnick (1987).
Fact 2. (Resnick 1987, p. 52) If F belongs to the domain of the Gumbel law then
an = o (bn) as n→∞.
Fact 3. (Resnick 1987, p. 54) F belongs to the domain of attraction of the Frechet
distribution (i.e. ξ > 0) if and only if an = 0 and bn = F¯
−1 (1/n) as n → ∞ and F (·) is
regularly varying with index −ξ.
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Fact 4. (Resnick 1987, p. 59) F belongs to the domain of attraction of a Weibull
distribution if and only if w (F ) <∞ and F¯ (w (F )− x−1) is regularly varying with index ξ.
Facts 1 and 2 imply that m (·) is slowly varying (i.e. regularly varying with index 0)
for distributions in the Gumbel domain of attraction. Fact 3 implies that m (·) is regularly
varying with index ξ ∈ (0, 1) for distributions in the domain of attraction of the Frechet
law. Finally, Fact 4 implies that m (·) is slowly varying for distributions in the domain of
attraction of the Weibull law.
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